Using Tournaments to Reduce Agency Problems: The Case of Franchising

Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice

Volumn 35, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 427-447

  Gillis, William E ^a   Mcewan, Ellen ^b   Crook, T Russell ^b   Michael, Steven C ^c  

^a University of South Alabama   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955044481     PISSN: 10422587     EISSN: 15406520     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6520.2011.00438.x     Document Type: Article

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