Outsourcing manufacturing: Secure price-masking mechanisms for purchasing component parts

Production and Operations Management

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 165-180

  Deshpande, Vinayak ^a   Schwarz, Leroy B ^a   Atallah, Mikhail J ^b   Blanton, Marina ^c   Frikken, Keith B ^d  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Purdue University   (United States)

^c University of Notre Dame   (United States)

^d MIAMI UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

outsourcing; price masking; procurement; supply chain

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952655207     PISSN: 10591478     EISSN: 19375956     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2010.01188.x     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. Akerlof, G., 1970. The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Q. J. Econ. 89: 488-500.
2. Amaral, J., C. Billington, A. Tsay,. 2006. Safeguarding the promise of production outsourcing. Interfaces 36 (3): 220-233. (Pubitemid 43938162)
3. Armstrong, M., 1996. Multiproduct nonlinear pricing. Econometrica 64 (1): 51-75. (Pubitemid 126460414)
4. Armstrong, M., 2000. Optimal multi-object auctions. Rev. Econ. Stud. 67 (3): 455-481.
5. Atallah, M., V. Deshpande, H. Elmongui, L. Schwarz,. 2003. Secure supply-chain protocols. International Conference on E-Commerce, June 24-27, Newport Beach, CA, pp. 293-302.
6. Avery, C., T. Hendershott,. 2000. Bundling and optimal auctions of multiple products. Rev. Econ. Stud. 67 (3): 483-497.
7. Bichler, M., R. Steinberg, eds. 2007. Special issue on e-auctions and procurement operations. Prod. Oper. Manag. 16 (4): 401-403.
8. Brandt, F., T. Sandholm,. 2005. Efficient privacy-preserving protocols for multi-unit auctions. International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC), February 28-March 3, Roseau, The Commonwealth of Dominica. LNCS, Vol. 3570, pp. 298-312. (Pubitemid 41425483)
9. Cavinato, J., R. Kauffman,. 1999. The Purchasing Handbook. New York, McGraw-Hill.
10. Clifton, C., A. Iyer, R. Cho, J. Vaidya, J. Wei, M. Kantivoglu,. 2008. An approach to identifying beneficial collaboration securely in decentralized logistics systems. Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manage. 10: 108-125.
11. Cover, T., J. Thomas,. 1991. Elements of Information Theory. New York, Wiley-Interscience.
12. Damgård, I., Y. Ishai,. 2005. Constant-round multiparty computation using a black-box pseudorandom generator. Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 2005, August 14-18, Santa Barbara, CA. LNCS, Vol. 3621, pp. 378-394. (Pubitemid 43902125)
13. Decker, B. De, G. Neven, F. Piessens, E. Van Hoeymissen,. 2001. Second price auctions, a case study of secure distributed computing. IFIP International Working Conference on Distributed Applications and Interoperable Systems, September 17-19, Krakow, Poland, pp. 217-228.
14. Deshpande, V., L. Schwarz, M. Atallah, M. Blanton, K. Frikken, J. Li,. 2009. Secure-computations for collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment (scpfr). Purdue University, Working paper.
15. de Vries, S., R. Vohra,. 2003. Combinatorial auctions: A survey. INFORMS J. Comput. 15 (3): 284-309. (Pubitemid 39042722)
16. Elkind, E., H. Lipmaa,. 2004. Interleaving cryptography and mechanism design: The case of online auctions. Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC), February 9-12, Key West, FL, pp. 117-131.
17. Elmaghraby, W., 2000. Supply contract competition and sourcing policies. Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manage. 2 (4): 350-371.
18. Elmaghraby, W., 2007. Auctions within e-sourcing events. Prod. Oper. Manag. 16 (4): 409-422.
19. Franklin, M., M. Reiter,. 1996. The design and implementation of a secure auction service. IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng. 22 (5): 302-312. (Pubitemid 126771672)
20. Fudenberg, D., J. Tirole,. 2000. Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
21. Goldreich, O., 2004. Foundations of Cryptography. Volume 2: Basic Applications. New York, Cambridge University Press.
22. Goldreich, O., S. Micali, A. Wigderson,. 1987. How to play any mental game or a completeness theorem for protocols with honest majority. ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), May 25-27, New York, pp. 218-229. (Pubitemid 18643409)
23. Jakobsson, M., A. Juels,. 2000. Mix and match: Secure function evaluation via ciphertexts, ASIACRYPT 2000, December 3-7, Kyoto, Japan, pp. 162-177.
24. Jenster, P., 2005. Outsourcing-Insourcing: Can Vendors Make Money from the New Relationship Opportunities? J. Wiley, New York, NY.
25. Klemperer, P., 1999. Auction theory: A guide to the literature. J. Econ. Rev. 3: 227-260.
26. Kramer, R., T. Tyler,. 1996. Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
27. Lazo, A., P. Rathie,. 1978. On the entropy of continuous probability distributions (corresp.). IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 24 (1): 120-122. (Pubitemid 8580357)
28. Lee, H. L., C. S. Tang,. 1996. Managing supply chains with contract manufacturing. Asian J. Bus. Inf. Syst. 1 (1): 11-22.
29. Lindell, Y., B. Pinkas,. 2004. A proof of yao's protocol for secure two-party computation. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/175. Available at (accessed date May 6, 2010).
30. Malkhi, D., N. Nisan, B. Pinkas, Y. Sella,. 2004. Fairplay-A secure two-party computation system. Usenix Security Conference, August 9-13, San Diego, CA, pp. 287-302.
31. Milgrom, P., R. Weber,. 1982. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica 50 (5): 1089-1122.
32. Myerson, R., 1981. Optimal auction design. Math. Oper. Res. 6 (1): 58-73.
33. Naor, M., B. Pinkas, R. Sumner,. 1999. Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, November 3-5, Denver, CO, pp. 129-139.
34. Nelson, D., P. Moody, J. Stegner,. 2005. The Incredible Payback: Innovative Sourcing Solutions that Delivery Extraordinary Results. AMACOM, New York, NY.
35. Palfrey, T., 1983. Bundling decisions by a multiproduct monopolist with incomplete information. Econometrica 51 (2): 463-483.
36. Pick, A., 2004. Survival of the fittest? EMSnow.com. Available at (accessed date May 6, 2010).
37. Riley, J., W. Samuelson,. 1981. Optimal auctions. Am. Econ. Rev. 71 (3): 381-392.
38. Rothkopf, M. H., 2007. Thirteen reasons why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves process is not practical. Oper. Res. 55 (2): 191-197. (Pubitemid 46663455)
39. Rothkopf, M. H., A. B. Whinston,. 2007. On e-auctions for procurement operations. Prod. Oper. Manag. 16 (4): 404-408.
40. Rothschild, M., J. Stiglitz,. 1976. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information. Q. J. Econ. 80: 629-649.
41. Simchi-Levi, D., 2004. Managing the Supply Chain: The Definitive Guide for the Business Professional. New York, McGraw-Hill.
42. Simchi-Levi, D., S. Wu, Z. Shen,. 2004. Handbook of Quantitative Supply Chain Analysis. New York, Springer Science-Business Media, Inc.
43. Spence, A., 1974. Market Signaling. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
44. Sullivan, L., 2003. Motorola rewrites rules for EMS: New policy removes contractors from pricing negotiations. Electronics Supply and Manufacturing. Available at: (accessed date October 5, 2010).
45. Vickrey, W., 1961. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. J. Finance 16 (1): 8-37.
46. Yao, A., 1982. Protocols for secure computations. ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), May 5-7, San Francisco, CA, pp. 128-136.
47. Yao, A., 1986. How to generate and exchange secrets. IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science. October 27-29, Toronto, Canada, pp. 162-167.