Interleaving cryptography and mechanism design the case of online auctions

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 3110, Issue , 2004, Pages 117-131

  Elkind, Edith ^a   Lipmaa, Helger ^b  

^a Princeton University   (United States)

^b AALTO UNIVERSITY   (Finland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; COSTS; DATA PRIVACY; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MACHINE DESIGN;

AUCTION MECHANISMS; AUCTIONS; BID PRIVACY; COGNITIVE COSTS; INTERNAL PARAMETERS; MECHANISM DESIGN; MULTI-ROUND AUCTIONS; ONLINE AUCTIONS;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 35048820152     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-27809-2_16     Document Type: Article

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