Secure supply-chain protocols

Proceedings - IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce, CEC 2003

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 293-302

  Atallah, M J ^a   Elmongui, H G ^a   Deshpande, V ^b   Schwarz, L B ^b  

^a Purdue University   (United States)

^b PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Collaboration; Contracts; Cryptographic protocols; Government; Information security; Inventory management; National security; Resource management; Supply chain management; Supply chains

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; CONTRACTS; CURRICULA; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; INFORMATION MANAGEMENT; INVENTORY CONTROL; NATIONAL SECURITY; SECURITY OF DATA; SUPPLY CHAINS;

COLLABORATION; CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS; GOVERNMENT; INVENTORY MANAGEMENT; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT;

SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT;

EID: 77954694081     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/COEC.2003.1210264     Document Type: Conference Paper

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