Efficient privacy-preserving protocols for multi-unit auctions

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Volumn 3570, Issue , 2005, Pages 298-312

  Brandt, Felix ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BANDWIDTH; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; CRYPTOGRAPHY; ELECTRIC RATES; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

BIDDERS; HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION; MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS; ORACLE MODEL;

NETWORK PROTOCOLS;

EID: 26444526224     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1007/11507840_26     Document Type: Conference Paper

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