In defence of virtue epistemology

Synthese

Volumn 179, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 409-433

  Kelp, Christoph ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Achievement; Knowledge; Pritchard; Virtue epistemology

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952188172     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9681-y     Document Type: Article

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