Calling party pays or receiving party pays? The diffusion of mobile telephony with endogenous regulation

Information Economics and Policy

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 107-117

  Dewenter, Ralf ^a   Kruse, Jörn ^b  

^a HEINRICH HEINE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b HELMUT SCHMIDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Calling party pays; Endogenous regulation; Mobile telephony markets; Mobile termination fees

Indexed keywords

CALLING PARTY PAYS; DIFFUSION PATTERNS; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; ENDOGENOUS REGULATION; INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS; INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES; MOBILE TELEPHONY; MOBILE TELEPHONY MARKETS; MOBILE TERMINATION FEES; PANEL DATA; PENETRATION RATES; REGULATORY DECISIONS; REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS; SIGNIFICANT IMPACTS;

MOBILE COMMUNICATION; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK; TELEPHONE NETWORK;

EID: 79952042129     PISSN: 01676245     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2010.09.001     Document Type: Article

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