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Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2010, Pages

Network-based price discrimination and 'Bill-and-Keep' vs. 'Cost-Based' regulation of mobile termination rates

Author keywords

bill and keep; call externalities; mobile termination rates; network effects; regulation

Indexed keywords


EID: 77957372911     PISSN: None     EISSN: 14469022     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1196     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (31)

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