Efficient intercarrier compensation for competing networks when customers share the value of a call

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 207-230

  DeGraba, Patrick ^a  

^a FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037998825     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/105864003766754206     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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