Mobile termination charges: Calling Party Pays versus Receiving Party Pays

Telecommunications Policy

Volumn 30, Issue 5-6, 2006, Pages 242-277

  Littlechild, S C ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bill and keep; Calling Party Pays; Mobile Party Pays; Mobile termination charges; Receiving Party Pays

Indexed keywords

BILL AND KEEP; CALLING PARTY PAYS; MOBILE PARTY PAYS; MOBILE TERMINATION CHARGES; RECEIVING PARTY PAYS;

COST EFFECTIVENESS; COSTS; CUSTOMER SATISFACTION; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS; PUBLIC POLICY; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

FEES AND CHARGES;

EID: 33646134631     PISSN: 03085961     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2006.01.002     Document Type: Article

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