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Volumn 86, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 107-112

Bill-and-keep vs. cost-based access pricing revisited

Author keywords

Access charge; Bill and keep; Call externality; Interconnection; Telecommunications

Indexed keywords


EID: 10944274166     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.07.003     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (43)

References (12)
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    • Network interconnection in telecommunications
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    • Armstrong, M.1
  • 2
    • 0141827295 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection
    • Elsevier Amsterdam
    • M. Armstrong M.E. Cave The Theory of Access Pricing and Interconnection Handbook of Telecommunications Economics vol. 1 2002 Elsevier Amsterdam 295-384
    • (2002) Handbook of Telecommunications Economics , vol.1 , pp. 295-384
    • Armstrong, M.1
  • 4
    • 0142024002 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Network competition with price discrimination: 'Bill-and-keep' is not so bad after all
    • C. Cambini T. Valletti Network competition with price discrimination: 'bill-and-keep' is not so bad after all Economics Letters 81 2003 205-213
    • (2003) Economics Letters , vol.81 , pp. 205-213
    • Cambini, C.1    Valletti, T.2
  • 5
    • 0037998825 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Efficient intercarrier compensation for competing networks when customers share the value of a call
    • P. DeGraba Efficient intercarrier compensation for competing networks when customers share the value of a call Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 12 2003 207-230
    • (2003) Journal of Economics and Management Strategy , vol.12 , pp. 207-230
    • DeGraba, P.1
  • 6
    • 0035607220 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Using "Bill and Keep" interconnect arrangements to soften network competition
    • J. Gans S. King Using "Bill and Keep" interconnect arrangements to soften network competition Economics Letters 71 2001 413-420
    • (2001) Economics Letters , vol.71 , pp. 413-420
    • Gans, J.1    King, S.2
  • 7
    • 0042630970 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Nonlinear pricing of telecommunications with call and network externalities
    • J. Hahn Nonlinear pricing of telecommunications with call and network externalities International Journal of Industrial Organization 21 2003 949-967
    • (2003) International Journal of Industrial Organization , vol.21 , pp. 949-967
    • Hahn, J.1
  • 9
    • 0035366254 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • An economic analysis of the receiver pays principle
    • J.Y. Kim Y. Lim An economic analysis of the receiver pays principle Information Economics and Policy 13 2001 231-260
    • (2001) Information Economics and Policy , vol.13 , pp. 231-260
    • Kim, J.Y.1    Lim, Y.2
  • 10
    • 0032398182 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Network competition: I. Overview and nondiscriminatory pricing
    • J. Laffont P. Rey J. Tirole Network competition: I. Overview and nondiscriminatory pricing Rand Journal of Economics 29 1998 1-37
    • (1998) Rand Journal of Economics , vol.29 , pp. 1-37
    • Laffont, J.1    Rey, P.2    Tirole, J.3


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.