Bill-and-keep vs. cost-based access pricing revisited

Economics Letters

Volumn 86, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 107-112

  Berger, Ulrich ^a  

^a VIENNA UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Austria)

Author keywords

Access charge; Bill and keep; Call externality; Interconnection; Telecommunications

Indexed keywords

EID: 10944274166     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.07.003     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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