Revitalizing the institutional roots of Anglo-American corporate governance

Economy and Society

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 84-111

  Moore, Marc T ^a   Rebérioux, Antoine ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS OUEST NANTERRE LA DÉFENSE   (France)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Berle and means; Corporate governance; Law; Stock market efficiency; Worker involvement

Indexed keywords

CENTRALIZATION; CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK; CORPORATE STRATEGY; ECONOMIC THEORY; FIRM OWNERSHIP; INDUSTRIAL PRACTICE; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; STOCK MARKET; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT;

WESTERN EUROPE;

EID: 79951787284     PISSN: 03085147     EISSN: 14695766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/03085147.2011.529340     Document Type: Article

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