The trajectory of (corporate law) scholarship

Cambridge Law Journal

Volumn 63, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 456-506

  Cheffins, Brian R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 85012506527     PISSN: 00081973     EISSN: 14692139     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0008197304006658     Document Type: Article

References (314)

1. John Gava, “Scholarship and Community” (1994) 16 Sydney L. Rev. 443, 443.
2. George P. Fletcher, “Two Modes of Legal Thought” (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 970, 970; Deborah L. Rhode, “Legal Scholarship” (2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, 1327. For an exception, see David Kennedy, “When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box” (2000) 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. and Pol. 335, though the purpose of this article was to discuss international law rather than legal scholarship generally. See also Brian R. Cheffins, “Corporations” in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford 2003), 486, 501-507, which outlines in a summary way various themes developed in this paper.
3. On the volume of legal scholarship, see Peter Birks, “The Academic and the Practitioner” (1998) 18 Legal Stud. 397, 398; Reinhard Zimmermann, “Law Reviews: A Foray Through a Strange World” (1998) 47 Emory L.J. 659, 692-693; Darla L. Daniel, “Of Deckchairs, Icebergs and Gestalt Shifts: Unger, Kahn, and a Student of Contemporary Legal Thought” (2001) 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 851, 852. On the literature on legal scholarship, see Mary B. Beazley and Linda H. Edwards, “The Process and the Product: A Bibliography of Scholarship About Legal Scholarship” (1998) 49 Mercer L. Rev. 741.
4. David P. Bryden, “Scholarship about Scholarship” (1992) 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 641, 641.
5. For a criticism of “congenial pluralism” in the context of legal scholarship, see John C.P. Goldberg, “Twentieth Century Tort Theory” (2003) 91 Geo. L.J. 513, 580-582.
6. There is a tendency to assume that everyone knows what is meant by scholarship in general and legal scholarship in particular: David Feldman, “The Nature of Legal Scholarship” (1989) 52 Mod. L. Rev. 498, 498.
7. Kenneth Lasson, “Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure” (1990) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926, 935; Edward L. Rubin, “Legal Scholarship” in Dennis Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) pp. 562, 562.
8. On this definition of theoretical legal scholarship and how it relates to writing about jurisprudence, see Brian R. Cheffins, “Using Theory to Study Law: A Company Law Perspective” (1998) 58 Cambridge L.J. 197, 198.
9. Rubin, above note 9, at 564-566; Richard A. Posner, “The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship” (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1113, 1113-1116. On various sub-categories of doctrinal scholarship, see Philip C. Kissam, “The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship” (1988) 63 Wash. L. Rev. 221, 230-235.
10. Rubin, above note 9, at 564-566.
11. Cheffins, above note 10, at 197; Michael Chesterman and David Weisbrot, “Legal Scholarship in Australia” (1987) 50 Mod. L. Rev. 709, 722-724; Richard Posner, “Legal Scholarship Today” (2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1317, 1320.
12. Indeed, at least one author of a book on the subject has refrained from offering a definition: Margarita Mathiopoulos, History and Progress-In Search of the European and American Mind (New York 1989), 5 (saying that to “attempt to arrive at a conclusive definition of progress would be as presumptuous as trying to prove or disprove the existence of supernatural powers”).
13. On these questions, see Charles van Doren, The Idea of Progress (New York 1967), 5-6, 13- 15, 23, 31-32, 261-263.
14. The Idea of Progress. at 6; John Bagnell Bury, The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its Origin and Growth (London 1924), 2, 5.
15. Van Doren, above note 15, at 324, 333; Robert Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress (London: Heinemann, 1980), 5; Michael D. Birnhack, “The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law” (2001) 1 Buff. Intell. Prop. J. 3, 13-14. Still, there are some who contend that cumulativity may not be an essential element of progress. See, for example, Larry Laudan, Beyond Positivism and Relativism: Theory, Method and Evidence (Boulder, Colo. 1996), 22-23.
16. Edward L. Rubin, “Law And and the Methodology of Law” [1997] Wis. L. Rev. 521, 526; Carl N. Edwards, “In Search of Legal Scholarship: Strategies for the Integration of Science into the Practice of Law” (1998) 8 So. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1, 21.
17. Lawrence M. Friedman, “The Law and Society Movement” (1986) 38 Stan. L. Rev. 763, 766.
18. Marcello Pera, “In Praise of Cumulative Progress” in Joseph C. Pitt (ed.), Changes and Progress in Modern Science (Dordecht 1985), pp. 267, 267; Jan Beyea and Daniel Berger, “Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert Gatekeepers: The Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures” (2001) 64 Law and Contemp. Probs. 327, 330-331.
19. Edwards, above note 18, at 24; Nancy Levit, “Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and Scientific Method” (1989) 58 Fordham L. Rev. 263, 266-272. See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) 509 U.S. 579, 590, where Justice Blackman observed that “(s)cience… is a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement… “.
20. For a classic statement of this version of scientific method, see Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London 1959). Scientific method, however, can also be based upon observation and induction. On the distinction between the “deductive” and “inductive” approaches to science, see David B. Spence, “A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued” (2002) 87 Cornell L. Rev. 397, 400-404.
21. The notion of “legal science” was a popular one throughout the 19th century in the United States but Langdell's approach constituted a substantial departure from earlier forms. See Howard Schweber, “The ‘Science’ of Legal Science: The Model of the Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education” (1999) 17 Law and History Rev. 421, 455-464.
22. Robert W. Gordon, “Lawyers, Scholars, and the ‘Middle Ground’ ” (1993) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2075, 2079-2080; Lawrence M. Friedman, American Law in the Twentieth Century (New Haven 2002), 490.
23. On Langdell's version of legal science, see Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Oxford 1995), 14-24; Thomas C. Grey, “Langdell's Orthodoxy” (1983-1984) 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1; Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Cambridge, Mass. 1993), 170-175.
24. Levit, above note 21 at 276; Anthony J. Sebok, Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence (Cambridge 1998), 91-96. Still, the approach adopted by Langdell was not purely inductive. See Dennis Patterson, “Langdell's Legacy” (1995) 90 Nw. Univ. L. Rev. 196, 200, n. 22.
25. Duxbury, above note 25 at 24-25, 36-37, 79; John Veilleux, “The Scientific Model in Law” (1987) 75 Geo. L.J. 1967, 1977-1978.
26. Kronman, above note 25, at 195-201; Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (New York 1992), 209-211; Brian Leiter, “Is There an ‘American’ Jurisprudence?” (1997) 17 Oxford J. of Legal St. 367, 377-378.
27. Kronman, above note 25, at 225-232, 240.
28. Posner, above note 11, at 1121-1122; Jason Scott Johnston, “Law, Economics, and Post- Realist Explanation” (1990) 24 Law and Soc'y Rev. 1217, 1231-1232; Jonathan R. Macey, “Law and the Social Sciences” (1997) 21 Harv J. L. and Pub. Pol'y 171, 172-173.
29. Daniel, above note 3, at 866-867; Posner, above note 11, at 1120-1121.
30. Friedman, above note 24, at 501; Franz Werro, “Notes on the Purpose and Aims of Comparative Law” (2001) 75 Tul. L. Rev. 1225, 1229. Note, though, that scientific method, as described here, does not directly influence the Continental version of legal science. See Fletcher, above note 2, at 988-989.
31. See, for example, Veilleux, above note 27; Peter Ziegler, “A General Theory of Law as a Paradigm for Legal Research” (1988) 51 Mod. L. Rev. 569; Peter A. Alces, “Contract Reconceived” (2001) 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 39, 95-97.
32. John Baldwin and Gwynn Davis, “Empirical Research in Law” in Cane and Tushnet, above note 2, 880, 881-882; Michael Heise, “The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism” [2002] U. Ill. Rev. 819, 821, 824-826, 831.
33. Thomas S. Ulen, “A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law” [2002] U. Ill. Rev. 875, 909-910, 912-916.
34. Changes and Progress in Modern Science., at 894-895.
35. Changes and Progress in Modern Science., at 895.
36. Changes and Progress in Modern Science.
37. Edwards, above note 18, at 21-22; Rubin, above note 18, at 550; Terence Daintith, “Legal Research and Legal Values” (1989) 52 Mod. L. Rev. 352, 357; Todd D. Rakoff, “Introduction” (2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1278, 1285-1286.
38. Edwards, above note 18, at 23-26; Rubin, above note 18, at 524-528, 542; Michael J. Graetz and Charles H. Whitbread, “Monrad Paulsen and the Idea of a University Law School” (1981) 67 Va. L. Rev. 445, 455.
39. Friedman, above note 24, at 501; Roger C. Cramton, “Demystifying Legal Scholarship” (1986) 75 Geo. L.J. 1, 6-8; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, “The Scholar as Advocate” (1993) 43 J. Legal Educ. 391, 394; Graham Brown, “Should Law Professors Practice What They Teach?” (2001) 42 So. Tex. L. Rev. 316, 335.
40. Edward L. Rubin, “On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship” (1992) 80 Cal. L. Rev. 889, 904.
41. Rubin, above note 18, at 540-541.
42. John Pheby, Methodology and Economics: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke 1988), 32-36; Daniel M. Hausman, “Kuhn, Lakatos and the Character of Economics” in Roger E. Backhouse (ed.), New Directions in Economic Methodology (New York 1994), 195, 208-210; Gregory S. Crespi, “The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Confronting the Problems of Nonfalsifiability and Normative Bias” (1991) 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 231, 232-233, 237-242.
43. For examples of those who have cast doubt on the scientific credentials of law and economics, see Levit, above note 21, at 282-285; Mark V. Tushnet, “Law, Science, and Law and Economics” (1997) 21 Harv J. L. and Public Policy 47, 51-52. For a response, see Thomas S. Ulen, “The Prudence of Law and Economics: Why More Economics is Better” (1996) 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 773, 788-793.
44. “You Can't Follow the Science Wars Without a Battle Map” Economist, December 11, 1997, 109, 109-110.
45. Kuhn's seminal work was The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago 1996). The book has sold more than a million copies since its initial publication in 1962 and it has been described as “the most influential academic work of the second half of the twentieth century”: Mark Blaug, “Book Review” (2001) 33 Hist. Pol. Econ. 855, 855.
46. To illustrate, a search of Westlaw's “JLR” directory conducted in February 2004 with the query ” ‘Thomas Kuhn’ and paradigm” yielded 579 documents. This electronic database has wide coverage of US law reviews extending back to the early 1980s.
47. Summarising Kuhn is difficult, in part because Kuhn qualified many of his assertions after the first edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago 1962). On this pattern, see Blaug, above note 47, at 855. For a thorough overview of Kuhn's work, see Paul Hoyningen- Heune, Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science (Chicago 1993).
48. The shift away from the “paradigm” terminology to “disciplinary matrix” was an example of Kuhn qualifying his basic concepts as time progressed. See Kuhn, above note 47, at 182; Blaug, above note 47, at 855.
49. Kuhn, above note 47, at 102, 110, 112, 147-151.
50. Methodology and Economics: A Critical Introduction. at 170-173, 206-207.
51. Many have inferred from Kuhn's work that one paradigm is just as good as another, but it is open to question whether he believed this: Ulen, above note 35, at 885.
52. Louis Menand, “Undisciplined” Wilson Q., Autumn 2001, 51, 58-59.
53. Esther-Mirjam Sent, “Thomas Kuhn: The Wrong Person at the Wrong Time, by Steve Fuller” (2001) 63 Review of Politics 390, 390.
54. Robert Fulford, “Paradigm: Putting the ‘P’ Word in Perspective” Globe and Mail, June 5, 1999, at D9; Wade Roush, “Dwarf Standing on Giants” Tech. Rev., Sept./Oct. 2000, 126 at 126.
55. Steven L. Winter,” ‘Bull Durham’ and the Uses of Theory” (1990) 42 Stan. L. Rev. 639, 670, n. 162.
56. Alces, above note 33, at 79-87.
57. George A. Martinez, “Race and Immigration Law: A Paradigm Shift” [2000] U. Ill. L. Rev. 517.
58. Jeffrey W. Stempel, “New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform” (1993) 53 Brook. L. Rev. 659.
59. Juan F. Perera, “The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The ‘Normal Science’ of American Racial Thought” (1997) 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1213.
60. As Kuhn observed: “I used to say that if you go through college in science and mathematics you may well get your bachelor's degree without having been exposed to the Structure of Scientific Revolutions. If you go through college in any other field you will read it at least once. That was not altogether what I wanted (quoted in Blaug, above note 47, at 855)”. See also Kuhn, above note 47, at 208-209.
61. Note, though, that Kuhn explicitly identified the use of precedent in judicial decisions as an example of paradigm elaboration: Kuhn, above note 47, at 23.
62. Ziegler, above note 33, at 573-574; Stempel, above note 60, at 699.
63. See above notes 40-42 and related discussion.
64. Daintith, above note 39, at 356-357; Rubin, above note 42, at 895-896; Charles W. Collier, “Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship in Search of a Paradigm” (1993) 42 Duke L.J. 840, 842- 844.
65. See Laudan, above note 17, at 8-9, 14-17; “You Can't Follow… ” above note 46, at 110.
66. See, for example, Rubin, above note 42; Joseph W. Singer, “The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory” (1984) 94 Yale L.J. 1, 33-35; John S. Elson, “The Case Against Legal Scholarship or, If the Professor Must Publish, Must the Profession Perish?” (1989) 39 J. Legal Educ. 343, 356-357, 362-364.
67. This follows the approach adopted by Kissam, above note 11, at 254-55. Still, it must be acknowledged that the working assumption is a somewhat heroic one, since entire volumes have been devoted to ascertaining the precise content of “truth”. See, for example, Richard Campbell, Truth and Historicity (Oxford 1992).
68. See George L. Priest, “The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and the Industrial Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge Edwards” (1993) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1929, 1940-1942; Robert C. Ellickson, “The Market for ‘Law-And’ Scholarship” (1997) 21 Harv J. L. and Public Policy 157, 164-170; Erwin Chereminsky and Catherine Fisk, “In Defense of the Big Tent: The Importance of Recognizing the Many Audiences for Legal Scholarship” (1999) 34 Tulsa L.J. 667, 675-676.
69. Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937, (Cambridge, Mass. 1991), 346. On the more general proposition that the operation of market forces can yield intellectual progress, see van Doren, above note 15, at 95-97; Nisbet, above note 17, at 187-193, 299 (focusing primarily on the work of Adam Smith).
70. See Lasson, above note 9, at 948-949; Chereminsky and Fisk, above note 71, at 677-678.
71. Note, though, that consumer preferences in the legal scholarship market are not homogeneous: Michael D. McClintock, “The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study” (1998) 51 Okla. L. Rev. 659, 686-687.
72. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, “The Deprofessionalisation of Legal Teaching and Scholarship” (1993) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1921, 1925.
73. Eisenberg, above note 41 at 391-398, Richard B. Schmitt, “Rules May Require Law Professors to Disclose Fees” Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 2000, at B1; Richard Lippitt, “Intellectual Honesty, Industry and Interest Sponsored Professorial Works, and Full Disclosure: Is the Viewpoint Earning the Money, or is the Money Earning the Viewpoint?” (2001) 47 Wayne L. Rev. 1075, 1081-1085, 1094-1095.
74. Zimmerman, above note 3, at 692; David L. Gregory, “The Assault on Scholarship” (1991) 32 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 993, 996-997, 1001.
75. Si Li and Hui Ou-Yang, “Incentives, Performance, and Academic Tenure” (2003), unpublished working paper (providing data indicating that the number of publications and number of citations generated by economists at leading American universities is much the same before and after tenure).
76. Ellickson, above note 71, at 169 (raising the possibility to cast doubt upon it).
77. Rhode, above note 2, at 1356; George L. Priest, “Triumphs or Failings of Modern Legal Scholarship and the Conditions of its Production” (1992) 63 U. Col. L. Rev. 725, 726-729.
78. Peter Goodrich, “Of Blackstone's Tower: Metaphors of Distance and Histories of the English Law School” in Peter B.H. Birks, (ed.), What are Law Schools For? (Oxford 1996), 59, 66.
79. Friedman, above note 24, at 493.
80. Gava, above note 1, at 461, 465; Rhode, above note 2, at 1331; Neil Duxbury, “When Trying is Failing: Holmes's ‘Englishness’ ” (1997) 63 Brook. L. Rev. 145, 149-150. Not everyone agrees. See, for example, Gregory, above note 77, at 998.
81. Posner, above note 75, at 1928 (making this observation while characterising the production of legal scholarship in sociobiological terms).
82. See, for example, Rhode, above note 2, at 1333-1336, 1339-1342; Zimmerman, above note 3, at 677-681, 689-690; Lasson, above note 9, at 942-948; Friedman, above note 24, at 497-499.
83. Gava, above note 1, at 446.
84. Duxbury, above note 25, at 2-3.
85. Methodology and Economics: A Critical Introduction.
86. Friedman, above note 19, at 766. For background on the law and society movement and Friedman's contribution to it, see Duxbury, above note 25, at 440-445.
87. Mark Tushnet,” ‘Everything Old is New Again': Early Reflections on the “New Chicago School” [1998] Wisc. L. Rev. 579, 579, 584-585.
88. Kennedy, above note 2, at 340, 376.
89. David S. Clark, “Nothing New in 2000? Comparative Law in 1900 and Today” (2001) 75 Tul. L. Rev., 871, 894.
90. Van Doren, above note 15, at 21-22, 113-114; Birnhack, above note 17, at 9. There is a more pessimistic alternative-regression-which is not considered here. On “theories of regress” see van Doren, above note 15, at 114-116, 119-121.
91. On the link between this phrase and a cyclical trajectory of ideas, see van Doren, above note 15, at 114.
92. For one of the many sources citing the quote, see John Willman, “Turning Back the Hands of Time” Fin. Times, October 19, 2002, FT Weekend, at 4.
93. Still, there may well be scope for progress in such fields. See, for example, van Doren, above note 15, at 331-332.
94. Jim Chen and David Schultz, “Force Majeure in Legal Scholarship” (1997) 14 Const. Comment. 427, 428.
95. Duxbury, above note 25, at 2-3.
96. Leiter, above note 28, at 372.
97. John Hagan, “The New Legal Scholarship: Problems and Prospects” 1 Can. J. L. and Soc. 35, 35, 37 (1986).
98. John H. Langbein, “Scholarly and Professional Objectives in Legal Education: American Trends and English Comparisons” in Birks, above note 81, 1, 6. See also Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet, “Introduction and Guide for the Reader” in Cane and Tushnet, above note 2, ix, x.
99. K.D. Kerameus, “Comparative Law and Comparative Lawyers: Opening Remarks” (2001) 75 Tul. L. Rev. 865, 870.
100. Virginia Nolan and Edmund Ursin, “The Deacademification of Tort Theory” (1999) 48 U. Kan. L. Rev. 59, 59 (quoting an American Association of Law Schools pamphlet but arguing that the sense of accomplishment was misplaced).
101. Ngaire Naffine, “In Praise of Legal Feminism” (2002) 22 Legal Stud. 71, 71.
102. Richard A. Epstein, “Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future” (1997) 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1167, 1172. For a similar verdict, see Thomas S. Ulen, “Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of Law” [1997] Wisconsin L. Rev. 433, 434, 463.
103. Cass R. Sunstein, “Foreword: On Academic Fads and Fashions” (2001) 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1251, 1253.
104. Methodology and Economics: A Critical Introduction. at 1251-1252, 1264.
105. See above notes 76-80 and related discussion.
106. Sushil Bikhchandani et al., “Learning from the Behaviour of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades” (1998) 12 J. Econ. Persp. 151, 160; David Hirshleifer, “Informational Cascades and Social Conventions” in Peter Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol. 2 (Basingstoke 1998), 300, 302.
107. Hirshleifer, above note 110, at 301, 303.
108. Academia had previously been identified as an environment where the literature seemed relevant: Hirshleifer, above note 110, at 305.
109. Sunstein, above note 107, at 1254-1256.
110. Methodology and Economics: A Critical Introduction. at 1256-58. This is known as a “reputational cascade”. See Robert C. Ellickson, “The Market for Social Norms” (2001) 3 Am. L. and Econ. Rev. 1, 26. Younger scholars do have an incentive to discover novel approaches, but arguably the legal academy's reward structure requires that their elders can appreciate an innovative move as continuing a tradition with which the elders are associated. See Tushnet, above note 91, at 581.
111. Sunstein, above note 107, at 1258-1261.
112. Methodology and Economics: A Critical Introduction. at 1261-1263.
113. Methodology and Economics: A Critical Introduction. at 1263-1264.
114. William Twining, “Academic Law and Legal Philosophy: The Significance of Herbert Hart” (1979) 95 Law Q. Rev. 557, 569.
115. Neil Duxbury, “History as Hyperbole” (1995) 15 Oxf. J. Legal Stud. 477, 487.
116. Neil Duxbury, “A Century of Legal Studies” in Cane and Tushnet, above note 2, 950, 965.
117. Peter Cane, “Review of Executive Action” in Cane and Tushnet, above note 2, 146, 157. See also Duxbury, above note 120, 964, 969-970.
118. Twining, above note 118, at 570.
119. On the notion that open v. closed networks can have an effect on the quality of legal scholarship, see Posner, above note 13, at 1325.
120. Kennedy, above note 2.
121. Methodology and Economics: A Critical Introduction. at 398.
122. Methodology and Economics: A Critical Introduction. at 399.
123. Under English law, “bankruptcy” refers solely to insolvency proceedings involving individuals whereas corporate proceedings are referred to as “corporate insolvency”. See John Armour et al., “Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom” (2002) 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1699, 1736, n. 187.
124. See, for example, Alan Brudner, The Unity of the Common Law: Studies in Hegelian Jurisprudence (Berkeley 1995); Peter Benson, “Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory” (1989) 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1077, 1095-1117; David Gray Carlson, “How to do Things With Hegel” (2000) 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1377.
125. Posner, above note 13, at 1325.
126. For examples, see Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Cambridge, Mass. 1986), 11-16, 29-31, 57-63; Alan Schwartz, “Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts” (1992) 36 J.L. and Econ. 595.
127. Posner, above note 13, at 1325.
128. Rakoff, above note 39, at 1286-1287; Judith S. Kaye, “One Judge's View of Academic Law Review Writing” (1989) 39 J. Legal Educ. 313, 318-321; Jean R. Sternlight, “Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common Sense Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications” (1996) 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 707, 772-775.
129. Brown, above note 41, at 334.
130. Eisenberg, above note 41, at 393.
131. Bruce A. Ackerman, “The Marketplace of Ideas” (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1131, 1135-1137; Meir Dan-Cohen, “Listeners and Eavesdroppers: Substantive Legal Theory and its Audience” (1992) 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 569, 586-588.
132. Paul L. Davies, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, 6th ed. (London 1997), 36-46; F.W. Wegenast, The Law of Canadian Companies (Toronto 1931), 17-27.
133. Horwitz, above note 28, at 101.
134. Methodology and Economics: A Critical Introduction. at 75; Mark M. Hager, “Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organisational ‘Real Entity’ Theory” (1989) 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 575, 579-580.
135. Gregory A. Mark, “The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law” (1987) 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1441, 1465-1467.
136. John Dewey, “The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality” (1926) 35 Yale L.J. 655. On the impact of this article, see Hager, above note 138, 635-639; William W. Bratton, “Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn” (2001) 26 J. Corp. L. 737, 741-43.
137. William W. Bratton, “The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History” (1989) 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1493; Ben Pettet, Company Law (Harlow 2001), 53.
138. Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New Brunswick, New Jersey 1991; originally New York 1932).
139. See Mark, above note 139, at 1480-1481 as well as Horwitz, above note 28, at 166; Bratton, above note 140, at 743, 753-754; Gregory A. Mark, “Realms of Choice: Finance Capitalism and Corporate Governance” (1995) 95 Colum. L. Rev. 969, 974-975.
140. On the “corporate revolution” terminology, see Walter Werner, “Corporation Law in Search of its Future” (1981) 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1611, 1641-1642; William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America (Princeton 1997), 3, 176.
141. Berle and Means, above note 142, at 5.
142. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. at 3.
143. Henry G. Manne, “The Myth of Corporate Responsibility or Will the Real Ralph Nader Please Stand Up?” (1970) 26 Bus. Law. 533, 533.
144. Edward S. Mason, “Introduction” in Edward S. Mason (ed.), The Corporation in Modern Society (Cambridge, Mass 1959), pp. 1, 4.
145. Carl Kaysen, “The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation” (1957) 47 Am. Econ. Rev. 311, 316. See also William J. Carney, “The Legacy of ‘The Market for Corporate Control’ and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm” (1999) 50 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 215, 221, 223 (summarising the literature).
146. Bayless Manning, “Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform” (1977) 41 Law and Contemp. Probs. 3, 14.
147. Elliot J. Weiss, “Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse” (1981) 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 343, 414.
148. Melvin A. Eisenberg, “Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants” (1975) 63 Cal. L. Rev. 375, 407-409.
149. J.A.C. Hetherington, “Redefining the Task of Corporation Law” (1985) 19 U. San. Fran. L. Rev. 229, 235.
150. Bratton, above note 140, at 761-762; Phillip I. Blumberg, “The Politicization of the Corporation” (1971) 26 Bus. Law. 1551, 1556; Scott R. Bowman, The Modern Corporation and American Political Thought: Law, Power, and Ideology (University Park, Pennsylvania 1996), 186, 206.
151. Berle and Means, above note 142, Book I, ch. 3.
152. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. at 309-313. It is somewhat ironic that Berle and Means’ work cast doubt on what was the received wisdom under American law, namely that generating profits for shareholders is the objective corporations should pursue. This is because Berle, in a well-known exchange with E.M. Dodd, expressed doubt whether the law was capable of expanding to accommodate the perceived public responsibilities of the modern corporation. For an overview of the debate, see Dalia Tsuk, “Corporations Without Labour: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law” (2003) 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1861, 1891-1896, 1899.
153. See, for example, Weiss, above note 151, at 344-346, 418-426; Abram Chayes, “The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law” in Mason, above note 148, at 25, 38-45.
154. Roberta Romano, “Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform” (1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev. 923, 923.
155. Adolf A. Berle, “Modern Functions of the Corporate System” (1962) 62 Colum. L. Rev. 433, 433.
156. Henry G. Manne, “Intellectual Styles and the Evolution of American Corporate Law” in Gerard Radnitzky and Peter Bernholz, (eds.), Economic Imperialism: The Economic Approach Applied Outside the Field of Economics (New York 1987), 219, 223. For similar observations, see Robert Hessen, “A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private Property Model” (1979) 30 Hastings L.J. 1327, 1329; George W. Dent, “Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation” [1989] Wisc. L. Rev. 881, 881.
157. William W. Bratton, “The ‘Nexus of Contracts’ Corporation: A Critical Appraisal” (1989) 74 Cornell L. Rev. 407, 415-416; Paddy Ireland, “Defending the Rentier: Corporate Theory and the Reprivatisation of the Public Company” in John Parkinson et al. (eds.), The Political Economy of the Company (Oxford 2000), 141, 157-158.
158. The most influential paper in this movement was Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 307.
159. See The Modern Corporation and Private Property. at 311 (“a nexus for contracting relationships”); Eugene F. Fama, “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm” (1980) 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288, 290.
160. Jensen and Meckling, above note 162 was the seminal contribution to the literature.
161. The economy theory of agency costs must be distinguished from the legal concept of agency: Brian R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford 1997), 45.
162. Jason Scott Johnston, “The Influence of ‘The Nature of the Firm’ on the Theory of Corporate Law” (1993) 18 J. Corp. L. 213, 234-235.
163. On this and other market-oriented constraints managers face, see Cheffins, above note 165, at 117-123.
164. Lynne L. Dallas, “Working Toward a New Paradigm” in Lawrence E. Mitchell, (ed.), Progressive Corporate Law (Boulder, Colorado 1995), pp. 35, 37; Ross Grantham, “The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders” [1998] C.L.J. 554, 554-555; Paddy Ireland, “Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership” (1999) 62 Mod. L. Rev. 32, 32, 48-49.
165. Fama, above note 163, at 290.
166. Daniel R. Fischel, The ” ‘Race to the Bottom’ Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law” (1982) 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 913, 917-918; Stephen M. Bainbridge, “In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green” (1993) 50 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 1423, 1428.
167. Cheffins, above note 165, at 54, 71, 87; William A. Klein, “The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints” (1982) 91 Yale L.J. 1521, 1538-1540; Frank H. Easterbrook, and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, Mass. 1991), 67-68. For criticism of the thesis that shareholders constitute residual claimants, see Lynn A. Stout, “Bad and Not-so-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy” (2002) 75 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1189, 1193-1195.
168. Frank H. Easterbrook, and Daniel R. Fischel, “Voting in Corporate Law” (1983) 26 J. L. and Econ. 395, 403, 406; Melvin A. Eisenberg, “The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm” (1999) 24 J. Corp. L. 819, 833-834; Thomas A. Smith, “The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty” (1999) 98 Mich. L. Rev. 214, 215-217.
169. Easterbrook and Fischel, above note 171, at 38, 68; Mark E. Van der Weide, “Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders” (1996) 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 27, 57-66; Michael Bradley, et al., “The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at Crossroads” (1999) 62 Law and Contemp. Probs. 9, 37-38.
170. Van der Weide, above note 173, at 35-55; Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, “Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective” (1993) 43 U. Toronto L.J. 401, 416- 419; Roberta Romano, “Corporate Law and Corporate Governance” (1996) 5 Indus. and Corp. Change 277, 279-280.
171. Douglas M. Branson, “A Corporate Paleontologist's Look at Law and Economics in the Seventh Circuit” (1989) 65 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 745, 745.
172. William T. Allen, “Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law” (1993) 50 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 1395, 1401. See also Johnston, above note 166, at 213, 231; Lewis A. Kornhauser, “The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel” (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1449, 1449; William W. Bratton, “The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation” (1992) 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 180, 180, 190.
173. J. Mark Ramseyer, “Corporate Law” in Newman, above note 110, vol. 1, 503, 504.
174. Douglas M. Branson, “Corporate Governance ‘Reform’ and the New Corporate Social Responsibility” (2001) 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 605, 619.
175. Allen, above note 176, at 1399 (saying that some of corporate law's “most respected minds remain among the unconverted”); G. Mitu Gulati et al., “Connected Contracts” (2000) 47 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 887, 947.
176. See, for instance, Eric W. Orts, “Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm” (1998) 16 Yale L. and Pol'y Rev. 265, 266-267, 298-299; Margaret M. Blair, and Lynn A. Stout, “Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioural Foundations of Corporate Law” (2001) 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1735, 1737-1738; Therese H. Maynard, “Law Matters. Lawyers Matter” (2002) 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1501, 1507, 1528.
177. John C. Coffee, “Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation” (2001) 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2151, 2151; Melvin A. Eisenberg, “Corporate Law and Social Norms” (1999) 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253, 1253-1254, 1291.
178. Edward B. Rock, and Michael L. Wachter, “Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and the Self-Governing Corporation” (2001) 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1619, 1629-1630, 1638-1639.
179. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. at 1621-1623. Rock and Wachter prefer, however, to refer to “nonlegally enforceable rules and standards” or “NLERS” rather than norms: The Modern Corporation and Private Property. at 1641.
180. Cf. Marcel Kahan, “The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance” (2001) 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1869, 1870, 1900.
181. On the wording, see Margaret M. Blair, and Lynn A. Stout, “A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law” (1999) 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 278. They have developed their ideas further in Blair and Stout, above note 180; Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, “Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board” (2001) 79 Wash. U.L.Q. 403.
182. Blair and Stout, “Team” above note 185, at 271-272, 275-285; Blair and Stout, “Director” above note 185, at 411-422.
183. Blair and Stout, “Team” above note 185, at 253, 286, 298-305; Blair and Stout, “Director” above note 185, at 424-425.
184. David Millon, “New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law” (2000) 86 Va. L. Rev. 1001, 1005-1009, 1023-1024.
185. Blair and Stout, above note 180, at 1756-1757; Blair and Stout, “Team” above note 185, at 283.
186. Blair and Stout, “Team” above note 185, at 283-284, 316; Blair and Stout, “Director” above note 185, at 436-443.
187. Blair and Stout, above note 180, at 1741, 1766-1774; Blair and Stout, “Director” above note 185, at 439-440. Blair and Stout do not specifically mention “behavioural economics”. They rely sufficiently on the relevant literature, however, to be cited as authors who do so. See, for example, Kent Greenfield, “Using Behavioural Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as a Regulatory Tool” (2002) 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 581, 585, n. 9.
188. Cass R. Sunstein, “Introduction” in Cass R. Sunstein, (ed.), Behavioural Law and Economics (Cambridge 2000), 1, 8.
189. Jennifer Arlen et al., “Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships” (2002) 31 J. Legal Stud. 1, 2-4; for examples of corporate law scholarship where inferences have been drawn from behavioural economics, see Greenfield, above note 191, at 585, n. 9.
190. Arlen et al., above note 193, at 5-6, 33.
191. Henry Hansmann, and Reinier Kraakman, “The Essential Role of Organizational Law” (2000) 110 Yale L.J. 387; Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, “Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning” (2000) 44 Eur. Econ. Rev. 807. See also John Armour and Michael J. Whincop, “An Economic Analysis of Shared Property in Partnership and Close Corporations Law” (2001) 26 J. Corp. L. 983.
192. Hansmann and Kraakman, “Essential” above note 195, at 391.
193. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. at 393-396.
194. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. at 428-432; see also Cheffins, above note 165, at 39-40.
195. Hansmann and Kraakman, “Essential” above note 195, at 406-423.
196. Cheffins, above note 10, at 209.
197. John W. Cioffi, “State of the Art: A Review Essay on ‘Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research’ ” (2000) 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 501, 509. See also Nicholas H.D. Foster, “Company Law Theory in Comparative Perspective: England and France” (2000) 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 573, 606-608.
198. Foster, above note 202 at 586-592; Pippa Rogerson, “Book Review” (1994) 53 Cambridge L.J. 601, 601; Paddy Ireland, “Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory” (2003) 23 Legal Stud. 453, 453. There were occasional isolated exceptions to the dominant pattern, such as Tom Hadden, Company Law and Capitalism (London 1972).
199. Mary Stokes, “Company Law and Legal Theory” in William Twining (ed.), Legal Theory and Common Law (Oxford 1986), pp. 155, 155.
200. Kathleen A. Lahey, and Sarah W. Salter, “Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal Scholarship: From Classicism to Feminism” (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall L.J. 543, 557-569; Katherine H. Hall, “The Interior Design of Corporate Law: Why Theory is Vital to the Development of Corporate Law in Australia” (1996) 6 Austl. J. Corp. L. 1, 1, 4-5; David Wishart, “Does the High Court Understand Corporations Law?” (1996) 6 Austl. J. Corp. L. 424, 436-438 (acknowledging that some theoretical work had been done in Australia but arguing that it was superficial in orientation).
201. This is consistent with general trends. See David E. Van Zandt, “American Jurisprudence, 1870-1970: a History, by James E. Herget (Book Review)” (1991) 28 Hous. L. Rev. 965, 968 (saying that foreign scholars increasingly want to learn more about American theories and approaches and see their own country's scholarship as too closely tied to practice).
202. Cioffi, above note 202, at 508-509.
203. Cheffins, above note 10, at 209; Foster, above note 202, at 593-594; Byran Horrigan, “Teaching and Integrating Recent Developments in Corporate Law, Theory and Practice” (2001) 13 Austl. J. of Corp. L. 182, 185-186.
204. Cioffi, above note 202, at 509; Foster, above note 202, at 593; J. Anthony VanDuzer, “Book Review” (1998) 77 Can. Bar Rev. 567, 567; Michael Whincop, “Of Fault and Default: Contractarianism as a Theory of Anglo-Australian Corporate Law” (1997) 21 Melb. U. L. Rev. 187, 188-189.
205. Grantham, above note 168, at 578-579; J.E. Parkinson, “The Contractual Theory of the Company and the Protection of Non-Shareholder Interests” in David Feldman and Frank Meisel, (eds.), Corporate and Commercial Law: Modern Developments, (London 1996) 121, 121; Robert Yalden, “Book Review” (1999) 31 Can. Bus. L.J. 479, 479; Michael Whincop, “Painting the Corporate Cathedral: The Protection of Entitlements in Corporate Law” (1999) 19 Oxford J. Legal St. 19, 19-20.
206. Yalden, above note 210, at 479.
207. See, for example, Pettet, above note 141, at 78-81; Ireland, above note 203, at 454-456; Parkinson, above note 210, at 140-141; Janet Dine, The Governance of Corporate Groups (Cambridge 2000), 12-17.
208. John Lowry and Alan Dignam, Company Law, 2nd ed. (London 2003), 372-73; see also Pettet, above note 141, at 66, n. 105 (citing examples from the “immense” stakeholder literature).
209. Berle and Means, above note 142, Book I, chapters 4, 5.
210. For a careful effort to test and challenge Berle and Means’ empirical findings, see Philip H. Burch, The Managerial Revolution Reassessed: Family Control in America's Large Corporations (Lexington, Mass. 1972), 113-143.
211. Johnston, above note 166, at 220.
212. See, for example, Berle and Means, above note 142, Book II, chapters I-IV, VII.
213. Johnston, above note 166, at 219-229.
214. John C. Coffee, “Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response” (1977) 63 Va. L. Rev. 1099, 1109-1110.
215. See above notes 175-176 and related text.
216. Johnston, above note 166, at 239-240; Fred S. McChesney, “Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field” (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1530, 1538.
217. Lyman Johnson, “Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise” (1992) 92 Colum. L. Rev. 2215, 2217-2218.
218. Lawrence E. Mitchell, “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Corporate Law” (1993) 50 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 1477, 1477.
219. Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano, “Event Studies and the Law: Part II-Empirical Studies of Corporate Law” (2002) 4 Am. L. and Econ. Rev. 380, 381.
220. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. at 382.
221. On the informational content of share prices and event studies, see Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano, “Event Studies and the Law: Part I-Technique and Corporate Litigation” (2002) 4 Am. L. and Econ. Rev. 141, 143 (saying, though, that event studies may be useful even if share prices do not adjust rapidly to new information). On the fact that it cannot be taken for granted that share prices are a reliable indicator of firm value, see Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioural Finance (Oxford 2000) 178-84.
222. For overviews of the literature, see Stephen J. Choi, “Law, Finance and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Markets” (2002) 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1657, 1672-1673; Diane K. Denis and John J. McConnell, “International Corporate Governance” (2003) 38 J. Fin. and Quantitative Analysis 1, 20-26.
223. Fred S. McChesney, “Positive Economics and All That” (1992) 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 272, 289-92.
224. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. at 292.
225. See above notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
226. See above notes 54-56 and related discussion.
227. See sources cited below notes 235-236, 241 and accompanying text.
228. Nevertheless, “paradigm” terminology has been used to describe the corporate personality debate. See, for example, Mark, above note 139, at 1466-1467, n. 66; Stephen Bottomley, “Taking Corporations Seriously: Some Considerations for Corporate Regulation” (1990) 19 Fed. L. Rev. 203, 206-213.
229. Examples of those who have described Berle and Means’ work in this way include Carney, above note 149, at 217, 224; Bratton, above note 176, at 180; Thomas Lee Hazen, “The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values” (1991) 69 N.C. L. Rev. 273, 304.
230. Manne, above note 147, at 534. See also J.A.C. Hetherington, “Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social Responsibility” (1969) 21 Stan. L. Rev. 248, 272; Robert Hessen, “The Modern Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal” (1983) 26 J. L. and Econ. 273, 288.
231. On Manne's work on this topic, see Carney, above note 149, at 231-236.
232. On the fact that Manne deserves credit for a critique of existing orthodoxy rather than for developing an affirmative economically grounded theory of the corporation, see Allen Kaufman and Lawrence Zacharias, “From Trust to Contract: The Legal Language of Managerial Ideology, 1920-1980” (1992) 66 Bus. Hist. Rev. 523, 546-547, 553.
233. For examples of those who have described contractarian analysis in these terms, see Allen, above note 176, at 1401, 1406; Bratton, above note 176, at 180-181, 190; Whincop, above note 210, at 27; Robert John Schulze, “Can This Marriage be Saved? Reconciling Progressivism with Profits in Corporate Governance Laws” (1997) 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1607, 1610.
234. Ulen, above note 35, at 886-887 (making the same point about economic analysis generally, referring to work which has been done in the field of behavioural economics).
235. On the doctrinal focus outside the United States, see above notes 202-205 and related discussion. Note, though, that up to the 1980s much American corporate law scholarship was in fact doctrinally oriented: Johnson, above note 224, at 2217; Charles R.T. O'Kelley, “Foreword: The Many Passions of Teaching Corporations” (2000) 34 Ga L. Rev. 423, 426. Also, it would have been somewhat perverse if Berle and Means’ work had set the agenda outside the US since a separation of ownership and control is not the norm elsewhere. See Rafael La Porta et al., “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance” (2000) 58 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 15.
236. See above notes 208, 210, 211 and related discussion.
237. See above notes 207, 212 and accompanying text.
238. See above note 70 and related discussion.
239. See above notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
240. See above notes 81-85 and related discussion.
241. Arnold S. Jacobs, “An Analysis of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934” 32 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 209 (1987), which also has some 4800 footnotes. On its status as the longest law review article, see Rhode, above note 2, at 1334-1335; Lasson, above note 9, at 937-938.
242. Bayless Manning, “The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker” (1962) 72 Yale L.J. 223, 245, n. 37.
243. Romano, above note 158, at 923.
244. Lahey and Salter, above note 205, at 569.
245. Lowry and Dignam, above note 213, at 371; Caroline Bradley and Judith Freedman, “Changing Company Law” (1990) 53 Mod. L. Rev. 397, 398; C.A. Riley, “Gower: Still a Blueprint for Curriculum Reform in Company Law?” (1993) 13 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 271, 271.
246. Cioffi, above note 202, at 509.
247. D.D. Prentice, “Some Observations on the Teaching of Company Law” in P.B.H. Birks (ed.), Examining the Syllabus: Beyond the Core (Oxford 1993), 33, 35.
248. Yalden, above note 210, at 479. See also Richard W. Bauman, “Liberalism and Canadian Corporate Law” in Richard F. Devlin (ed.), Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto 1991), 75, 75.
249. Roberta Romano, “Preface” in Roberta Romano (ed.), Foundations of Corporate Law (Oxford 1992) v, v.
250. Richard M. Buxbaum, “New Owners and Old Managers: Lessons from the Socialist Camp” (1993) 18 Del. J. Corp. L. 867, 868.
251. Deborah A. DeMott, “Trust and Tension Within Corporations” (1996) 81 Cornell L. Rev. 1308, 1308, 1335.
252. Yalden, above note 210, at 479.
253. Prentice, above note 257, at 35.
254. Johnston, above note 166, at 219.
255. Johnson, above note 224, at 2217. On his scepticism towards economics, see The Modern Corporation and Private Property. at 2217-2218.
256. Romano, above note 259, at v; Buxbaum, above note 260, at 868; DeMott, above note 261, at 1312, 1335. See also Mitchell, above note 225, at 1477, 1481-1482; O'Kelley, above note 245, at 426.
257. See above notes 77, 79-80 and accompanying text.
258. See above notes 86-93 and related discussion.
259. A.A. Sommer, “Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later” (1991) 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 33, 33. See also William T. Allen, “Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation” (1992) 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 261, 278- 281; Eric W. Orts, “The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law” (1993) 50 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 1565, 1571.
260. Elliott Goldstein, “Future Articulation of Corporation Law” (1984) 39 Bus. Law. 1541, 1541.
261. Allen, above note 269, at 280-281.
262. On the “contractual/association” thesis, see above note 138 and accompanying text. On the link with the nexus of contracts model, see Bratton, above note 141, at 1472-1473, 1513- 1515, 1526; Gregory A. Mark, “Some Observations on Writing the Legal History of the Corporation in the Age of Theory” in Mitchell, above note 168, 67, 72-73.
263. On the fiction theory of the corporation, see above note 138 and related discussion. On Hansmann and Kraakman's asset partitioning characterisation of the corporation, see above notes 195-199 and accompanying text. For additional arguments that the fiction theory might have contemporary relevance, see Fiona Macmillan Patfield, “Challenges for Company Law” in Fiona Macmillan Patfield (ed.), Perspectives on Company Law, vol. 1 (London 1995), 1, 8- 9; Jennifer Hill, “Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder” (2000) 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 39, 56-57.
264. Note, though, that Hansmann and Kraakman downplay links between their asset-oriented analysis on the one hand and theories of juridical personality on the other: Hansmann and Kraakman, “Essential” above note 195, at 438-439.
265. The cyclical quality of debates on these issues has been recognised elsewhere. On managerial accountability, see Bratton, above note 140, 755-756; Bratton, above note 176, 182; David Millon, “Redefining Corporate Law” (1991) 24 Ind. L. Rev. 223, 225. On corporate goals and responsibilities, see Branson, above note 178, at 635-639; Sommer, above note 269, at 33-36; Roberta S. Karmel, “The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?” (1984) 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 534, 535-543.
266. See above notes 145-146 and related discussion.
267. See above notes 147-152 and accompanying text.
268. See above notes 164-165 and related discussion.
269. Alfred P. Carlton, “21st Century Corporate Responsibility-Evolution, Revolution, or Back to the Future” (2002) 54 Mercer L. Rev. 671, 672-673; for a plea that a “pendulum-like movement” be avoided, see Bengt Holmstrom and Steven N. Kaplan, “The State of US Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong?” J. Applied Corp. Fin., Spring 2003, 8, 20.
270. Stout, above note 171, at 1189-1190, 1208; C.A. Harwell Wells, “The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century” (2002) 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 77, 78-79, 82.
271. See above note 154 and related discussion.
272. See above notes 157 and accompanying text.
273. See above notes 188, 213 and related discussion. On the team production model as a component of the long-standing debates on corporate social responsibility, see Stout, above note 171, at 1195; Wells, above note 280, at 136-139.
274. See, for example, William A. Bratton, “Never Trust a Corporation” (2002) 70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 867, 867 (“corporate responsibility is a problem that never goes away… from policy agendas in academic corporate law”).
275. Kuhn, above note 47, at 153, 169. On the other hand, a cyclical account does not square fully with the Kuhnian characterisation of science, since he argued that scientific development should be “a unidirectional and irreversible process”: The Modern Corporation and Private Property. at 206.
276. See above note 94 and accompanying text.
277. The same point can potentially be made in relation to corporate goals and responsibilities: Stout, above note 171, at 1208 (arguing that even if the debate about the purpose of the corporation which has been going on since the 1930s has not been resolved, “there has been some progress in our understanding of it”).
278. Bratton, above note 176, at 182, n. 18.
279. Johnston, above note 166, at 231-241.
280. See above notes 238-239 and related discussion.
281. DeMott, above note 261, at 1335.
282. Cf. Sunstein, above note 107, at 1252 (making the same point about legal scholarship generally).
283. The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
284. The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
285. The Modern Corporation and Private Property… at 1262.
286. Tsuk, above note 156, at 1883; Walter Werner, “Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered” (1977) 77 Colum. L. Rev. 388, 394-395.
287. George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland, “The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means” (1983) 26 J.L. and Econ. 237, 241-242.
288. Hessen, above note 238, at 279; Werner, above note 296, at 395; Joseph L. Weiner, “The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation” (1964) 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1458, 1461.
289. Sunstein, above note 107, at 1262.
290. See above notes 161-163 and related discussion.
291. Elaine A. Welle, “Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of Securities Regulation by Private Agreement” (1999) 56 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 519, 524-525.
292. Bratton, above note 141, at 1524-1525; Tsuk, above note 156, at 1904; Cynthia A. Williams, “Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency” (1998) 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1265, 1287-1288.
293. Robert B. Thompson, “The Law's Limits on Contracts in a Corporation” (1990) 15 J. Corp. L. 377, 388; Robert A. Hillman, The Richness of Contract Law: An Analysis and Critique of Contemporary Theories of Contract Law (Dordrecht 1997), 98-99. For examples of deregulatory bias, see Hetherington, above note 153, at 251-254, 257; McChesney, above note 223, at 1544, 1548; Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, “The Corporate Contract” (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416, 1442.
294. See above note 117 and related discussion and text following note 122.
295. Bratton, above note 176, at 197; Johnson, above note 224, at 2218; Douglas M. Branson, “The Death of Contractarianism and the Vindication of Structure and Authority in Corporate Governance and Corporate Law” in Mitchell, above note 168, 93, at 105.
296. Melvin A. Eisenberg, “Contractarianism Without Contracts: A Response to Professor McChesney” (1990) 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1321, 1331. He was certainly not the only sceptic. See above note 179 and accompanying text.
297. See above note 180 and related discussion.
298. Eisenberg, above note 172, at 818, 823, 827, 829.
299. See above note 123 and related discussion.
300. See above notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
301. Cheffins, above note 10, at 214-215.
302. Stephen Bainbridge, “Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship” (1997) 82 Cornell L. Rev. 856, 858-859.
303. Thomas Ulen, “The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics” (1993) 18 J. Corp. L. 301, 331.
304. Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties (Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 153), (London 1998), Part 3.
305. DeMott, above note 261, 1335. See also Lyman Johnson, “New Approaches to Corporate Law” (1993) 50 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 1713, 1723.
306. DeMott, above note 261, 1335.
307. Philip C. Kissam, “The Decline of Law School Professionalism” (1986) 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 251, 297; Charles W. Collier, “The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship” (1991) 41 Duke L.J. 191, 203; Joseph P. Tomain and Paul L. Caron, “The Associate Dean for Faculty Research Position: Encouraging and Promoting Scholarship” (2001) 33 U. Tol. L. Rev. 233, 237.
308. See above note 291 and related discussion.
309. Baldwin and Davis, above note 34, at 884-885; Ronald J. Allen, “Two Aspects of Law and Theory” (2000) 37 San Diego L. Rev. 743, 745; Barry Friedman, “The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship” (2001) 94 Nw. U.L. Rev. 933, 933, 951-952.
310. Heise, above note 34, at 826.
311. Michael A. Livingston, “Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the Legal Academy” (1998) 83 Cornell L. Rev. 365, 383; Beverley I. Moran, “Taxation” in Cane and Tushnet, above note 2, 377, 385-387.
312. Johnson, above note 315, at 1721.
313. See above notes 252-254 and related discussion.
314. Livingston, above note 321, at 385 (acknowledging that corporate law scholarship is, in key respects, significantly ahead of tax scholarship).