Does shareholder primacy lead to a decline in managerial accountability?

Cambridge Journal of Economics

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 507-524

  Rebérioux, Antoine ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS OUEST NANTERRE LA DÉFENSE   (France)

Author keywords

Managerial accountability; Shareholder primacy; Theory of the firm

Indexed keywords

ACCOUNTABILITY; BUSINESS; ECONOMIC THEORY; STOCK MARKET;

PYRONIA TITHONUS;

EID: 34547915902     PISSN: 0309166X     EISSN: 14643545     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/cje/bem009     Document Type: Article

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