The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice

The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-260

  Bainbridge, Stephen ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Boards; Corporations; Directors; Governance; Managerialism; Shareholders

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922702932     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195337501.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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