Agency theory and participative budgeting experiments

Journal of Management Accounting Research

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 317-345

  Brown, Jason L ^a   Evans III , John H ^b   Moser, Donald V ^b  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79951556725     PISSN: 10492127     EISSN: 15588033     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/jmar.2009.21.1.317     Document Type: Review

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