Honesty in managerial reporting

Accounting Review

Volumn 76, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 537-559

  Evans III, John H ^a   Hannan, R Lynn ^a   Krishnan, Ranjani ^a   Moser, Donald V ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Experiment; Honesty; Incentive contract; Managerial reporting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035486443     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2001.76.4.537     Document Type: Article

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