The effect of honesty and superior authority on budget proposals

Accounting Review

Volumn 83, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 1083-1099

  Rankin, Frederick W ^a   Schwartz, Steven T ^b   Young, Richard A ^c  

^a Department of Environmental and Radiological Health Sciences

^b BINGHAMTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Experiment; Honesty; Participatory budgeting; Slack

Indexed keywords

EID: 53549093333     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2008.83.4.1083     Document Type: Article

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