The effect of information systems on honesty in managerial reporting: A behavioral perspective;L'incidence des systèmes d'information sur l'honnêteté des gestionnaires dans la production d'information: Une perspective comportementale

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 885-918

  Hannan, R Lynn ^a   Rankin, Frederick W ^b   Towry, Kristy L ^c  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Department of Environmental and Radiological Health Sciences   (United States)

^c EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Honesty; Impression management; Information systems; Participatory budgeting

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845613664     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: 19113846     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1506/8274-J871-2JTT-5210     Document Type: Conference Paper

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