Reciprocity and the effectiveness of optimal agency contracts

Accounting Review

Volumn 84, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 1671-1694

  Kuang, Xi ^a   Moser, Donald V ^b  

^a GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Gift exchange; Optimal contract; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

EID: 72149113340     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2009.84.5.1671     Document Type: Article

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