Screening ethics when honest agents care about fairness

International Economic Review

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 59-85

  Alger, Ingela ^a   Renault, Ŕegis ^b  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645121583     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: 14682354     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2006.00372.x     Document Type: Review

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