Rent-seeking incentives, corporate political connections, and the control structure of private firms: Chinese evidence

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 229-243

  Chen, Charles J P ^a   Li, Zengquan ^b   Su, Xijia ^a   Sun, Zheng ^b  

^a CHINA EUROPE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS SCHOOL   (China)

^b SHANGHAI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS   (China)

Author keywords

Emerging markets; M16; M48; O18; Political connections; Rent seeking incentives

Indexed keywords

EID: 78751704660     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.09.009     Document Type: Article

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