New perspectives on the governance of executive compensation: An examination of the role and effect of compensation consultants

Journal of Management and Governance

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 29-58

  Conyon, Martin J ^a   Peck, Simon I ^b   Sadler, Graham V ^c  

^a ESSEC BUSINESS SCHOOL   (France)

^b CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c ASTON UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Consultants; Executive compensation

Indexed keywords

EID: 78751585478     PISSN: 13853457     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10997-009-9117-6     Document Type: Article

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