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Volumn 33, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 544-559

What Determines Managers' Pay? Evidence from Denmark

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EID: 0345813481     PISSN: 00246301     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0024-6301(00)00051-0     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (14)

References (31)
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