Frugal mechanism design via spectral techniques

Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 755-764

  Chen, Ning ^a   Elkind, Edith ^a   Gravin, Nick ^b   Petrov, Fedor ^b  

^a NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^b STEKLOV MATHEMATICAL INSTITUTE   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EIGENVALUES AND EIGENFUNCTIONS; MACHINE DESIGN; SALES;

CUSTOMER NEED; LARGEST EIGENVALUES; LOWER BOUNDS; MECHANISM DESIGN; SPECTRAL TECHNIQUES; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS; UNIFORM SCHEMES; YOUNG'S INEQUALITY;

SET THEORY;

EID: 78751493200     PISSN: 02725428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2010.77     Document Type: Conference Paper

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