Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 273, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 197-206

  Peña, Jorge ^a   Pestelacci, Enea ^a   Berchtold, André ^a   Tomassini, Marco ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Evolution of cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Non uniform interaction rates; Participation costs; Upstream reciprocity

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; GAME THEORY; RECIPROCITY;

ALTRUISM; ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; COOPERATION; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; EVOLUTION; GAME; PARTICIPATION COST; POPULATION STRUCTURE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIAL NETWORK; UPSTREAM RECIPROCITY;

ALTRUISM; COMPUTER SIMULATION; CONSUMER PARTICIPATION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; CULTURAL EVOLUTION; HUMANS; MARKOV CHAINS; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL;

EID: 78651577201     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.12.043     Document Type: Article

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