Evolution of cooperation when feedback to reputation scores is voluntary

JASSS

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 187-198

  Janssen, Marco ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

One Shot Prisoner Dilemma; Reputation; Symbols; Trust; Voluntary Feedback

Indexed keywords

EID: 32044449407     PISSN: 14607425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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