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Volumn 100, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 1892-1912

Efficiency gains from team-based coordination - Large-scale experimental evidence

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EID: 77956953399     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.4.1892     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (79)

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