Playing safe in coordination games: The roles of risk dominance, payoff dominace, and history of play

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 281-299

  Schmidt, David ^a   Shupp, Robert ^b   Walker, James M ^c   Ostrom, Elinor ^c  

^a FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION   (United States)

^b BALL STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Equilibrium selection; Experimental economics; Game theory; Payoff dominance; Risk dominance

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012645412     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00552-3     Document Type: Article

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