Renegotiation and the efficiency of investments

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 106-119

  Holden, Steinar ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033450267     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2556048     Document Type: Article

References (36)

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