Job responsibility, pay and promotion

Economic Journal

Volumn 107, Issue 440, 1997, Pages 85-103

  Manove, Michael ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040983714     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00143     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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