Equilibrium wage and dismissal processes

Journal of Business and Economic Statistics

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 221-236

  Flinn, Christopher J ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Efficiency wages; Measurement error; Panel data; Structural estimation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031522011     PISSN: 07350015     EISSN: 15372707     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07350015.1997.10524702     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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