Presidential values in parliamentary democracies

International Journal of Constitutional Law

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 207-236

  Albert, Richard ^a  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955944213     PISSN: 14742640     EISSN: 14742659     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icon/moq008     Document Type: Article

References (227)

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8. See, e.g. Constitution of Australia (1900).
9. Constitution of Canada (British North America Act 1867)
10. German Basic Law (1949)
11. Constitution of Spain (1978)
12. Israel Basic Law (1992)
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14. Alfred Stepan & Cindy Skach, Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism Versus Presidentialism, 46 World Pol. 1, 3 (1993).
15. Rett R. Ludwikowski, Latin American Hybrid Constitutionalism: The United States Presidentialism in the Civil Law Melting Pot, 21 B.U. Int'l L.J. 29, 34-39 (2003).
16. See, e.g., Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Venezuela, 45 Duq. L. Rev. 439, 464 (2007).
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35. Constitution of Ukraine, art. 6 (1996).
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50. See, e.g. Constitution of India, Pt. V, ch. I, art. 53 (1950) (vesting executive power in the President); Pt. V, ch. II, art. 79 (establishing a Parliament); Pt. V, ch. IV, art. 124 (establishing a Supreme Court); Pt. V, ch. V, art. 148 (establishing the office of Comptroller and Auditor-General). The Constitution authorizes the President to exercise limited legislative powers in exceptional circumstances. See Pt. V, ch. III, art. 123.
51. See, e.g., Constitution of Costa Rica, Title VIII, Ch. III, arts. 99-104 (1949) (establishing the Supreme Electoral Tribunal); Title IX (establishing the legislative branch); Title X (establishing the executive branch); Title XI (establishing the judicial branch); Title XIII, Ch. II, arts. 183-84 (establishing Office of the Comptroller General).
52. See, e.g., Charter of the United Nations, art. 7 (1945) (establishing the six principal organs of the United Nations).
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55. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and the Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 393, 451 (1996).
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65. The Federalist No. 48, at 333 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
66. The Federalist No. 49, at 341 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
67. The Federalist No. 78, at 524-525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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71. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217, 300-303 (1994).
72. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999).
73. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346 (2006).
74. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law: Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 137 (1993).
75. Harold Honju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J. 1255 (1988).
76. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
77. Jessica Korn, The Power of Separation 14-26 (1996)
78. Christopher F. Edley, JR., Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy 4 (1990).
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80. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1441-1451 (1987).
81. Ron Merkel, Separation of Powers-A Bulwark for Liberty and a Rights Culture, 69 Sask. L. Rev. 129, 129-30 (2006).
82. Stephen Holmes, Lineages of the Rule of Law, in Democracy and the Rule of Law 19 (J.M. Maravall & A. Przeworski eds. 2003).
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85. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 499-500 (2003).
86. Gregory M. Jones, Proper Judicial Activism, 14 Regent U. L. Rev. 141, 152 (2001).
87. Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 4, 12 (1987).
88. See Bradley A. Benedict, Note, Upsetting the Balance: Ignoring the Separation of Powers Doctrine in Council of New York v. Bloomberg, 72 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1261, 1266-1267 (2007).
89. Jeremy Travis, Note, Rethinking Sovereign Immunity After Bivens, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 597, 661 (1982).
90. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
91. See, e.g., Nicholas W. Barber, Prelude to the Separation of Powers, 60 Cambridge L.J. 59 (2001).
92. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 388 (3d ed. 1996).
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97. See, e.g., Barbara A. Cherry, The Telecommunications Economy and Regulation as Coevolving Complex Adaptive Systems: Implications for Federalism, 59 Fed. Comm. L.J. 369, 378 (2007).
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100. John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1311, 1403-4 (1997).
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107. Marco Verweij, Why is the River Rhine Cleaner than the Great Lakes (Despite Looser Regulation)?, 34 Law & Soc'y Rev. 1007, 1033 (2000).
108. Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 155, 164 (1995).
109. Constitution of the United States. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
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113. The Changing Constitution (Jeffrey L. Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 6th ed. 2007).
114. Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution 67 (1977)
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119. A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution xxxvi, 4 (8th ed. 1982).
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121. Lloyd N. Cutler, To Form a Government, 59 Foreign Affairs 126, 129 (1980).
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125. Roger Pilon, The War Powers in Brief: On the Irreducible Politics of the Matter, 2 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol'y & Ethics J. 49, 54-55 (2003).
126. John C. Yoo, The Constitution of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 167, 217 (1996).
127. Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents Without Mandates (With Special Emphasis on Ohio), 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 375, 386 (1999).
128. Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C.L. Rev. 1653, 1766 (2002).
129. Ernest A. Young, Book Review, English Constitutionalism Circa 2005, or, Some Funny Things Happened After the Revolution, 21 Const. Comment. 771, 802 (2004).
130. Adam Tomkins, Public Law 44-54 (2003)
131. V. Harris, The Constitutional Future of New Zealand, 2004 NZ L. Rev. 269, 274.
132. Colin Munro, The Separation of Powers, 1981 Public Law 19
133. J. Gregory Sidak, The Price of Experience: The Constitution After September 11, 2001, 19 Const. Comment. 37, 54 (2002).
134. Minasse Haile, Comparing Human Rights in Two Ethiopian Constitutions: The Emperor's and the "Republic's"? Cucullus Non Facit Monachum, 13 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 22 (2005).
135. Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1405, 1454 (2007).
136. R, Kent Weaver, Pension Reform in Canada: Lessons for the United States, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 45, 48 (2004).
137. David Golove, Exception and Emergency Powers: Comment On Exception and Emergency Powers, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1895, 1897 (2000).
138. Yen-Tu Su, Beyond Nightmare and Hope: Engineering Electoral Proportionality in Presidential Democracies, 30 J. Legis. 205, 231 (2004).
139. Harold A. McDougall, Constitutional Form and Civil Society: The Case of Jamaica, 16 St. Thomas L. Rev. 423, 432 (2004).
140. John C. Reitz, Political Economy and Separation of Powers, 15 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 579, 595 (2006).
141. Jonathan Zasloff, Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California's Separation of Powers, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 1079, 1126-1128 (2004).
142. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 635-636 (2000).
143. Donald P. Kommers, The Federal Constitutional Court: Guardian of German Democracy, 603 Annals 111, 116 (2006).
144. Itzhak Galnoor, The Judicialization of the Public Sphere in Israel, 37 Isr. L. Rev. 500, 536-537 (2003).
145. James A. Gardner, Democracy Without a Net? Separation of Powers and the Idea of Self-Sustaining Constitutional Constraints on Undemocratic Behavior, 79 St. John's L. Rev. 293, 315 (2005).
146. Ran Hirschl, The Struggle for Hegemony: Understanding Judicial Empowerment Through Constitutionalization in Culturally Divided Polities, 36 Stan. J. Int'l L. 73, 76-77 (2000).
147. Constitution of Canada (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
148. Janet L. Hiebert, New Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary Models Resist Judicial Dominance When Interpreting Rights?, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1963, 196519-66 (2004).
149. Constitution of Canada (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. VII (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) § 52.
150. Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 33.
151. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 14.
152. Fraser v. P.S.S.R.B., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455, at para. 39.
153. Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, at para. 104.
154. Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381, at para. 104.
155. Canada (House of Commons) v. Vaid, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 667, at para. 21.
156. Application under s.83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248, at para. 179.
157. Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405, at para. 39.
158. Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854, at paras. 12-13.
159. Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (P.E.I.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 139.
160. Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199, at paras. 51-54.
161. Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (2004)
162. William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635, 645 (1982).
163. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 400 (1978).
164. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 248 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner eds. 1966).
165. Rett R. Ludwikowski, "Mixed" Constitutions? Product of an East-Central European Constitutional Melting Pot, 16 B.U. Int'l L.J. 1, 34 (1998).
166. Luis Lopez Guerra, The Application of the Spanish Model in the Constitutional Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 1937, 1946 (1998).
167. Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 447, 464 (1991).
168. Peter Kresak, The Government Structure in the New Slovak Republic, 4 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 1 (1996).
169. Hanna Suchocka, Checks and Balances Under the New Constitution of Poland, 1998 St. Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic L.J. 45.
170. Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 23, 27 n.9 (1995).
171. Thomas Weishing Huang, The President Refuses to Cohabit: Semi-Presidentialism in Taiwan, 15 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y 375, 378-379 (2006).
172. See, e.g., Carlos Santiago Nino, Transition to Democracy, Corporatism and Constitutional Reform in Latin America, 44 U. Miami. L. Rev. 129, 164 (1989).
173. Michael Schoiswohl, Linking the International Legal Framework to Building the Formal Foundations of a " State at Risk" : Constitution-Making and International Law in Post-Conflict Afghanistan, 39 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 819, 838-839 (2006).
174. Lee Kendall Metcalf, Presidential Power in the Russian Constitution, 6 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 125, 137-138 (1996).
175. Christina M. McPherson, Note, Russia's 193 Constitution: Rule of Law for Russia or Merely a Return to Autocracy?, 27 Hastings Const. L.Q. 155, 160-163 (1999).
176. Carlo Dapelo, The Trends Towards Federalism in Italy, 15 St. Thomas L. Rev. 345, 348 (2002).
177. Dominique Custos, The Rulemaking Power of Independent Regulatory Agencies, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 615, 620 (2006).
178. Tom Ginsburg, Dismantling the "Developmental State"? Administrative Procedure Reform in Japan and Korea, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 585, 591 (2001).
179. Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s, 113 Yale L.J. 1341, 1409 (2004).
180. David Golove, Book Review, Liberal Revolution, Constitutionalism and the Consolidation of Democracy: A Review of Bruce Ackerman's The Future of Liberal Revolution, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 1591, 1601-02.
181. Eugene D. Mazo, Constitutional Roulette: The Russian Parliament's Battles with the President Over Appointing a Prime Minister, 41 Stan. J. Int'l L. 123, 135-136 (2005).
182. Martin A. Rogoff, Book Review, One, Two, Three, Four, Five, and Counting: A Sixth French Republic?, 10 Colum. J. Eur. L. 157, 160-163 (2003).
183. Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1045, 1091 (1994).
184. Carlos Santiago Nino, The Debate Over Constitutional Reform in Latin America, 16 Fordham Int'l L.J. 635, 645-650 (1993).
185. Mark Freeman, Constitutional Frameworks and Fragile Democracies: Choosing Between Parliamentarism, Presidentialism and Semi-Presidentialism, 12 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 253, 278 (2000).
186. The same criticism applies to presidential systems
187. See Charles O. Jones, Separate But Equal Branches: Congress and the Presidency 26 (1999).
188. Bernard Susser, Toward a Constitution for Israel, 37 St. Louis L.J. 939, 942-943 (1993).
189. Samuel H. Barnes, The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies, 95 A.J.I.L. 86, 95 (2001).
190. Lucio Pegoraro & Angela Rinella, Le gouvernement au Parlement selon le modèle semi-présidentiel: l'expérience française et les propositions de la Commission parlementaire pour les réformes constitutionnelles en Italie, 34 R.J.T. 275, 282 (2000).
191. A.E. Dick Howard, Constitution-Making in Central and Eastern Europe, 28 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 5, 9 (1994).
192. Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. Pa. L Rev. 801, 879 n.274 (1993).
193. Stephen J. Schnably, The OAS and Constitutionalism: Lessons from Recent West African Experience, 33 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 263, 266 (2005).
194. Charles Manga Fombad, The Separation of Powers and Constitutionalism in Africa: The Case of Botswana, 25 B.C. Third World L.J. 301, 318 (2005).
195. Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 592, 594 (1986).
196. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 493-500 (1987).
197. Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law 288 (M. Knight trans. 1967).
198. Roberto Unger, Law in Modern Society: Towards a Criticism Of Social Theory (1976)
199. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor In Society 24-27 (W.D. Halls trans. 1984).
200. Thomas O. Sargentich, Bowsher v. Synar: The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 430, 449-450 (1987).
201. See The Federalist No. 66, at 445 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
202. Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, art. 35 (March 8, 2004).
203. Constitution of Iraq, art. 134 (2005).
204. Edward Wong, A Kurd is Named Iraq's President as Tensions Boil, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR 5415889.
205. Kirk Semple, Ending Logjam, Iraq Parliament Fills Key Government Posts as Violence Goes On, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 2006, at A14, available at 2006 WLNR 6772362.
206. Edward Wong, Iraqi Parties Break a Deadlock on Candidates, Int'l Herald Tribune, Apr. 6, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 5359894.
207. Edmund Sanders, After Weeks of Arguing, Iraq's New Premier Named, L.A. Times, Apr. 8, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 23354538.
208. Noah Feldman & Roman Martinez, Constitutional Politics and Text in the New Iraq: An Experiment in Islamic Democracy, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 883, 913 (2006).
209. Chibli Mallat, On the Specificity of Middle Eastern Constitutionalism, 38 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 13, 51 n.94 (2006).
210. See Charles E. Ehrlich, Democratic Alternatives to Ethnic Conflict: Consociationalism and Neo-Separatism, 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 447, 448, 451 (2000).
211. Graham Walker, The Mixed Constitution After Liberalism, 4 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 311, 325 (1996).
212. Samuel H. Barnes, The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies, 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 86, 97 (2001).
213. The Canadian model of power-sharing is reflected in a statute requiring that three of the nine Supreme Court justices represent Quebec. See Supreme Court Act § 6, R.S., 1985, c. S-10, s.6.
214. Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 Eur. J. Int'l L. 247, 265-266 (2006).
215. William E. Forbath & Lawrence Sager, Comparative Avenues in Constitutional Law: An Introduction, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1653, 1660 (2004).
216. James A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the Possibility of Political Community, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1237, 1255 (2002).
217. Adeno Addis, The Kurdish Issue and Beyond: Territorial Communities Rivaling the State, 98 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 108, 110 (2004).
218. Angela M. Banks, Moderating Politics in Post-Conflict States: An Examination of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 10 UCLA J. Int'l & Foreign Aff. 1, 24 (2005).
219. David Wippman, Sharing Power in Iraq, 39 New eng. L. Rev. 29, 37 (2004).
220. Samuel Issacharoff, Constitutional Democracy in Fractured Societies, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1861, 1892 (2004).
221. See, e.g. Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985).
222. But see Michael Walzer, On Toleration 22 (1997) (praising consociationalism)
223. See Ban Ki-Moon, U.N. Mission in Haiti Must Succeed this Time, Irish Times, Aug. 10, 2007, at 16, available at 2007 WLNR 15429032.
224. Jacqueline Charles, Haiti Tries to Get a Handle on Violence, Philadelphia Inquirer (PA), Dec. 10, 2006, at A8, available at 2006 WLNR 21308238.
225. See, e.g., Louis Aucoin, Haiti's Constitutional Crisis, 17 B.U. Int'l L.J. 115, 140 (1999).
226. See, e.g., Justice Albie Sachs, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 1037 (2002).
227. See Alicia L. Bannon, Note, Designing a Constitution-Drafting Process: Lessons from Kenya, 116 Yale L.J. 1824 (2007).