Prelude to the Separation of Powers

Cambridge Law Journal

Volumn 60, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 59-88

  Barber, N W ^a  

^a BRASENOSE COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 85012445018     PISSN: 00081973     EISSN: 14692139     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0008197301000629     Document Type: Article

References (153)

1. This enterprise should be contrasted with work undertaken by theorists such as Bruce Ackerman, who has attempted to construct a complete vision of the separation of powers; see B. Ackerman, “The New Separation of Powers” (2000) 113 Harv.L.Rev. 633. The present article does not pose a direct challenge to Ackerman's work.
2. E. Barendt, “Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government” [1995] P.L. 599
3. E. Barendt, An Introduction to Constitutional Law (Oxford 1998), at pp. 14–17.
4. M. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis 1998), ch. 1
5. W.B. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers, Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. 9 (Tulane 1965), ch. 1.
6. Vile, Constitutionalism, at p. 14.
7. Barendt does not investigate the nature of these types of power at any length. On Montesquieu's definition of these powers see generally Vile, Constitutionalism, ch. 4
8. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, transl. by A. Cohler, B. Miller and H. Stone (Cambridge 1989), Bk. 11, ch. 6.
9. Morgan explores the division as reflected in case law in D. Morgan, Separation of Powers in the Irish Constitution (Dublin 1997).
10. Vile, Constitutionalism, at pp. 19–20.
11. Constitutionalism., at ch. 6, esp. pp. 161–162
12. J. Madison, in J. Madison, A. Hamilton and J. Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. I. Kramnick (London 1987), No. 46.
13. Myers v. U.S. (1926) 272 U.S. 52, at p. 293
14. see also Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, Bk. 19 ch. 27
15. S. Calabresi and K. Rhodes, “The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary” (1992) 105 Harv.L.Rev. 1153, at p. 1156, where separation of powers is described as “institutionalising conflict”.
16. I. Jennings, Law and the Constitution, 5th ed. (London 1959), at pp. 281–282, and 303.
17. A point recognised by Madison, Federalist Papers, No. 37, at p. 244.
18. G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford 1971), at pp. 99–100.
19. Barendt (1995) P.L. 599, at p. 605
20. citing Commissioners of Customs and Excise Ltd. v. Cure and Deeley Ltd. [1962] 1 Q.B. 340
21. Liyanage v. The Queen [1967] 1 A.C. 259.
22. Barendt [1995] P.L. 599, at p. 606.
23. Barendt (1995) P.L. 599, at p. 616
24. Barendt, Introduction, at p. 17.
25. See further A. Tomkins, “Of Constitutional Spectres. Review of Eric Barendt: An Introduction to Constitutional Law” [1999] P.L. 525
26. P. Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, transl. R. Balinski (Princeton 1995), who makes a similar criticism of Montesquieu, at pp. 54–55.
27. I deliberately avoid the term “state”. The classical view of the state is as a geographically bounded organism. Modern constitutional writing has shown that constitutions can transcend geography; providing political and legal constraints at an international, national and subnational level. See especially N. MacCormick, “Judicial Pluralism and the Risk of Conflict” in Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford 1999), and the other essays in that volume.
28. D. Morgan, Separation of Powers, at p. 282.
29. N. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives (Chicago 1994), at pp. 37–38.
30. Gwyn, Separation of Powers, at pp. 32–34.
31. Barendt (1995) P.L. 599, at p. 602
32. Morgan, Separation of Powers, at p. 4
33. P. Laslett, in J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett (Cambridge 1988), at pp. 118–120, provides qualified and indirect support for this view.
34. See also W. Gwyn, “Separation of Powers and Modern Forms of Democratic Government” in R. Goldwin and A. Kaufman (eds.), The Separation of Powers—Does it Still Work? (Washington 1986), at p. 70.
35. Vile, Constitutionalism, at pp. 63–74.
36. Locke, Two Treatises, para. 1–123.
37. Two Treatises., para. 137.
38. Two Treatises., para. 125.
39. A. Anderson “A 1787 Perspective on the Separation of Powers”, in R. Goldwin and A. Kaufman (eds.), The Separation of Powers—Does it Still Work? (Washington 1986), at p. 145.
40. Madison, The Federalist Papers, esp. No. 47.
41. The Federalist Papers, No. 37, at p. 243. Madison wrote: “Energy in government is essential to that security against external and internal danger and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws which enter into the very definition of good government.”
42. M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. III (Yale 1966), at p. 108
43. cited in Anderson, note 27 above, at p. 145.
44. Ackerman (2000) 113 Harv.L.Rev. 633, at p. 639.
45. On which see J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford 1986), ch. 13, Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, at p. 34.
46. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, at p. 114.
47. This is graphically illustrated by the constitutional failure of Latin American countries that imported the United States' constitution wholesale. See Ackerman (2000) 113 Harv.L.Rev. 633, at p. 646, and the materials cited therein.
48. F.A. Hayek, Rules and Order, at p. 65
49. reprinted in F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (London 1982).
50. F.A. Hayek, The Political Order of a Free People
51. reprinted in F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (London 1982), especially ch. 17.
52. Hayek does acknowledge that in countries with a long established constitutional structure his dictates may not hold: Law, Legislation and Liberty., at pp. 107–108.
53. Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, Part 3 Bk. 14.
54. Though ethnic divisions can not be legislated away, it may be possible to create deliberative forums through which debate can be constitutionalised. See J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford 1999), at pp. 73–74
55. D. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (California 1985), ch. 15
56. A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven 1977)
57. S. Smooha and T. Hart, “The Diverse Modes of Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies” in A.D. Smith (ed.), Ethnicity and Nationalism (New York 1992).
58. A. Lipjhart, Patterns of Democracy (Yale 1999), at pp. 32–33.
59. H. Jacobs, in H. Jacobs, E. Blankenburg, H. Kritzer, D. Provine and J. Saunders, Courts, Law and Politics in a Comparative Perspective (New York 1996), at pp. 7 and 33.
60. Ackerman (2000) 113 Harv.L.Rev. 633, at pp. 724–725.
61. P. Craig and G. de Búrca, E'U Law Text Cases and Materials, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1998), at pp. 50–57.
62. J. Fitzmaurice, “The European Commission” in A. Duff, J. Pinder and R. Pryce, Maastricht and Beyond (London 1994), at p. 181.
63. Jennnings, note 9 above; S.A. de Smith and R. Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 8th ed. (London 1998), at p. 18.
64. N.W. Barber “Sovereignty Re-examined: The Courts, Parliament and Statutes” [2000] O.J.L.S. 130
65. I. Canor, “rimus inter pares. Who is the Ultimate Guardian of Fundamental Rights In Europe?” (2000) 25 E.L.Rev. 3.
66. Ackerman (2000) 113 Harv.L.Rev. 633, at p. 691.
67. On this point, see the broader interpretation of the separation of powers advanced by Hayek, note 37 above, at p. 104.
68. M. Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (Chicago 1981), ch. 1.
69. E. Rubin, “The New Legal Process” (1996) 109 Harv.L.Rev. 1393, at p. 1428.
70. N. Bowles, Government and Politics of the United States, 2nd ed. (London 1998), ch. 7
71. M. Vile, Politics in the USA, 5th ed. (London 1999), at pp. 116–118.
72. K. Bradshaw and D. Pring, Parliament and Congress (London Rev. ed. 1981), ch. 5.
73. Parliament and Congress, at pp. 210–212.
74. I avoid the loaded term “quasi-judicial”. See, for example, R. v. Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, Ex p. Dyer [1994] 1 All E.R. 375
75. Bushell v. Environment Secretary [1980] 2 All E.R. 608
76. R. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal, Ex p. Gilmore [1957] 1 Q.B. 574
77. Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147
78. R. Cooke, “The Struggle For Simplicity in Administrative Law” in M. Taggart (ed.), Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the 1980s (Oxford 1986), at p. 10.
79. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, at p. 104
80. D. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (California 1977), at pp. 18, 24.
81. Shapiro, Courts, ch. 1.
82. Montequieu, Spirit of the Laws, Bk. 11, ch. 6.
83. Contrast K. Llewellyn and E. Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way (Oklahoma 1941), at p. 48
84. cited in L. Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harv.L.Rev. 353
85. Shapiro, above Courts, at p. 13. As with all the comments made in this section there may be qualifications to be made in some circumstances: for instance, when a settlement is made in a dispute involving a minor or an incapacitated person the court may demand the right to approve the agreement.
86. L. Fuller, note 64 above
87. see also R. Bone, “Lon Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation” (1995) 75 Boston U.L.Rev. 1273, at p. 1314 onwards
88. Horowitz, Courts, at pp. 30–33.
89. Fuller, (1978) 92 Harv.L.Rev. 353, at p. 395.
90. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, at p. 125.
91. Fuller (1978) 92 Harv.L.Rev. 353, at pp. 397–398.
92. J. Allison, “Fuller's Analysis of Polycentric Disputes and the Limits of Adjudication” (1994) 53 C.L.J. 367, at p. 372.
93. 53 C.L.J., at p. 372.
94. Horowitz, Courts, at pp. 35–38.
95. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, at pp. 125–134.
96. See E. Elhauge, “Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?” (1991) 101 Yale Law Journal 31, who argues that interest groups that are a weak force in society will also be a weak force before the courts.
97. Contrast T. Merrill, “Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism After All?” (1997) 21 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 219.
98. Fuller (1978) 92 Harv.L.Rev. 353, at p. 371.
99. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, at p. 204.
100. H. Abraham and B. Perry, Freedom and the Court, 7th ed. (Oxford 1998), at p. 354.
101. Fuller approved of the desegregation cases despite the obvious implications of polycentricity. See Allison (1994) 53 C.L.J. 367, at p. 374, citing a letter of Lon Fuller to Frank Newman on 22 October 1959.
102. J.H. Choper, Judicial Review and The National Political Process (Chicago 1980), at pp. 152–153.
103. Fuller (1978) 92 Harv.L.Rev. 353, at p. 373. The Sherman Act and the EC Treaty seem wilfully vague.
104. 92 Harv.L.Rev., at pp. 406–407.
105. R. v. Bow Street Magistrates Court, Ex p. Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2) [2000] 1 A.C. 119.
106. Craig and de Burca, European Law, at pp. 78–86.
107. Shapiro, Courts, at pp. 35–36, describes the adversarial form of such proceedings as a “facade”.
108. P. Davies and M. Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy (Oxford 1993), at p. 394.
109. Contrast the position in the United States: Shapiro, Courts, at p. 19.
110. I. Smith and G. Thomas, Industrial Law (London 1996), at p. 334. For similar reasons the French administrative court includes former civil servants amongst the judges.
111. This is recognised by the judges: Gilham v. Kent District Council (No. 2) [1985] I.C.R. 233, esp. pp. 240 and 244.
112. See generally, Smith and Thomas, Industrial Law, at pp. 339–347.
113. For example, Naylor v. Orton and Smith Ltd. [1983] I.R.L.R. 233, at 237
114. N. Browne-Wilkinson, “The Role of the EAT in the 1980s” [1982] I.L.J. 69.
115. For example, Bailey v. BP Oil (Kent Refinery) Ltd. [1980] I.C.R. 642
116. Philips “Some Notes on the Employment Appeals Tribunal” [1978] I.L.J. 137.
117. Sunil Batra v. Delhi AIR 1980 SC 1579
118. Kadra Pehadiya v. Bihar AIR 1981 SC 939
119. H. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, 4th ed. (Delhi 1993–1997), at pp. 1822–1824
120. S. Sathe, Administrative Law, 5th ed. (Delhi 1994), at pp. 383–384.
121. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 149
122. P. Craig and S. Deshpande, “Rights Autonomy and Process: Public Interest Litigation in India” [1989] O.J.L.S. 356.
123. Pratul Kumar Sinha v. Orissa AIR 1989 SC 1783
124. Sathe, Administrative Law, at pp. 385–386.
125. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 149
126. Craig and Deshpande [1989] O.J.L.S. 356, at pp. 363–364.
127. Sathe, Administrative Law, at p. 389
128. Shapiro, Courts, at p. 15
129. Choper, Judicial Review, at p. 139
130. M. Tushnet, Red, White and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Harvard 1988), at p. 198.
131. Sathe, Administrative Law, at p. 387.
132. Horowitz, Courts, at pp. 51–56
133. M. Galanter, “Missed Opportunities: the Use and Non-use of Law Favourable to Untouchables and Other Specially Vulnerable Groups” in M. Galanter, Law and Society in Modern India (Oxford 1997)
134. C. Epp, The Rights Revolution (Chicago 1998), ch. 6.
135. Shapiro, Courts, ch. 1.
136. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, at p. 204.
137. P. Norton, “Introduction” in P. Norton (ed.), Legislatures (Oxford 1990), at 8–9
138. though see J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford 1999)
139. J. Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge 1999). Waldron's premises, resting on understandings of democracy and legitimacy, and the conclusions he draws from them, are stronger than those advanced here. That neither his premises nor his conclusions figure in this section should not be taken as agreement or disagreement with them.
140. See, for example, the cautious submission of Wheare that even the seating within the legislature can affect the way which the body works. Presumably this would have an impact on its ability to undertake certain tasks: K. Wheare, Legislatures (London 1963), at pp. 8–14.
141. See, for instance, Lipjhart, Patterns.
142. Wheare, Legislatures, at p. 5.
143. On the wide range of possible functions of a legislature see R. Packenham, “Legislatures and Political Development”, reprinted in Norton, Legislatures.
144. J. Mill, “On Representative Government” in J. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. J. Gray (Oxford 1991), at p. 282.
145. On Liberty and Other Essays, at pp. 277–278.
146. On Liberty and Other Essays, at p. 271.
147. Wheare, Legislatures, at p. 148.
148. Vile, USA, at p. 117.
149. See Bradshaw and Pring, Congress and Parliament, at pp. 259–260
150. E. Redman, The Dance of Legislation (1973), at pp. 16–17
151. Vile, USA, at p. 133.
152. P.S. Atiyah, “Judicial Legislative Relations In England”, at pp. 158–159, in R. Katzmann (ed.), Judges and Legislators: Towards Institutional Comity (Washington 1988).
153. J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement, at pp. 69–72.