The pluralism of global administrative law

European Journal of International Law

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 247-278

  Krisch, Nico ^a  

^a MERTON COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 33645885027     PISSN: 09385428     EISSN: 14643596     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ejil/chi163     Document Type: Article

References (226)

1. See Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, 'The Emergence of Global Administrative Law', 68 Law and Contemporary Problems (2005) 15.
2. Oakerson, 'Governance Structures for Enhancing Accountability and Responsiveness', in J.L. Perry (ed.), Handbook of Public Administration (1989), 114, at 114.
3. On the different forms of accountability mechanisms, see Fisher, 'The European Union in the Age of Accountability', 24 Oxford J Legal Studies (2004) 495, at 501-508
4. Grant and Keohane, 'Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics', 99 American Political Science Review (2005) 29, at 35-37.
5. See also ibid., at 37.
6. See Keohane, 'Global Governance and Democratic Accountability', in D. Held and M. Koenig-Archibugi (eds), Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance (2003), 130, at 145.
7. See Scott, 'Accountability in the Regulatory State', 27 J Law and Society (2000) 38, at 39. It should be noted, though, that accountability (which operates mostly ex post) is not the only form of control but operates alongside various forms of potential ex ante control.
8. See ibid.
9. also H.F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (1967), at ch. 3
10. T. Macdonald, 'We the Peoples': NGOs and Democratic Representation in Global Politics, D.Phil. Dissertation, Oxford (2005), at ch. 8.
11. See also Scott, supra note 6, at 41.
12. Grant and Keohane, supra note 3, at 42.
13. Art. 20(2) of the Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland; for an English version, see www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/lit/the_basic_law.pdf.
14. I can sketch only some principal traits here. For more detail, see Rudolf, 'Kooperation im Bundesstaat', in J. Isensee and P. Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1990), iv, at 1091
15. Blümel, 'Verwaltungszustandigkeit', in ibid., at 857. On the tension of these interlinkages with the general constitutional prohibition of a common administration (Mischverwaltung),
16. see Hermes, 'Art. 83', in H. Dreier (ed.), Grundgesetz: Kommentar (2000), iii, at 1, 24-27.
17. Art. 84(1) Grundgesetz.
18. Art. 84(3) of the Grundgesetz. This supervision is limited to the conformity with federal law.
19. Art. 80(2) of the Grundgesetz. In practice, 40% of these regulations require Bundesrat consent: See Bauer, 'Art. 80', in Dreier, supra note 9, (1998), ii, at 1526, 1534.
20. See C. Joerges and E. Vos (eds), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics (1999). On the cooperative structure of European administration more generally,
21. see E. Schmidt-Aßmann and B. Schöndorf-Haubold (eds), Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund (2005).
22. But see Stewart, 'Federalism and Rights', 19 Georgia L Rev (1985) 917, on important deviations from this principle in practice.
23. See Stewart, 'The Reformation of American Administrative Law', 88 Harvard L Rev (1975) 1667.
24. See Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvL 5/98 and 2 BvL 6/98, 5 Dec. 2002, 107 BVerfGE 59
25. E. Schmidt-Aßmann, Das Allgemeine Verwaltungsrecht als Ordnungsidee (2nd edn., 2004), at 87-101, 262-266.
26. On the ideal of unity in modern constitutionalism, see J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (1995). For attempts at reconceptualizing this model within states (though from a different perspective from the one I focus on here),
27. see also Ladeur, 'Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality: The Viability of the Network Concept', 3 European LJ (1997) 33, at 43-16
28. Dorf and Sabel, 'A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism', 98 Columbia L Rev (1998) 267. For a related attempt with a primary focus on the European Union,
29. see Walker, 'The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism', 65 MLR (2002) 317, and the references infra in note 84.
30. I do not deal here with accountability to individuals with respect to their affected rights; on this, see Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, supra note 1, especially at 45-48.
31. I simplify here by treating nation and state as coextensive; especially in recent years, the issue of substate nations has (rightly) attracted much attention: See W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn., 2002), at ch. 8. I do not take this up here for reasons of clarity alone.
32. See Kingsbury, 'Sovereignty and Inequality', 9 EJIL (1998) 599, at 623-625.
33. See E.-W. Böckenförde, Staat, Nation, Europa (1999), at 103-126
34. Grimm, 'Does Europe Need a Constitution?', 1 European LJ (1995) 282, at 292-297
35. also J. Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation (1998), at 91-169.
36. For a broader defence of nationalism, see D. Miller, On Nationality (1995),
37. and for an overview of nationalist arguments, see Kymlicka and Straehle, 'Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States, and Minority Nationalism', 7 European Journal of Philosophy (1999) 65, at 68-72.
38. See Bundesverfassungsgericht (1993) 89 BVerfGE 155.
39. See Goldsmith, 'Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty', 55 Stanford L Rev (2003) 1667
40. Rubenfeld, 'The Two World Orders', 27 Wilson Quarterly (Autumn 2003) 22.
41. See also Dahl, 'Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic's View', in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordón (eds), Democracy's Edges (1999), at 19.
42. See A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (2004), at 230-244.
43. See, e.g., Simma, 'From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law', 250 Recueil des Cours (1994-VI) 217.
44. See, e.g., D. Held, Democracy and the Global Order (1995), at 236
45. I.M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy (2000), at 246-251
46. Kumm, 'The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis', 15 EJIL (2004) 907, at 922-924.
47. See Pogge, 'Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty', 103 Ethics (1992) 48, at 63-69.
48. At least alongside constituencies on other levels; see Held, supra note 26, at 226-238;
49. Pogge, supra note 27, at 57-69
50. Young, supra note 26, at 265-271.
51. See Falk and Strauss, 'Toward Global Parliament', 80 Foreign Affairs (Jan./Feb. 2001) 212.
52. See also the useful survey in Howse, 'Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and the Problem of Democracy', in G.A. Bermann, M. Herdegen, and P.L. Lindseth (eds), Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation (2000), at 469.
53. See Woods, 'Making the IMF and the World Bank More Accountable', 77 Int'l Affairs (2001) 83, at 85-87
54. Mattli and Büthe, 'Global Private Governance: Lessons from a National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting', 68 Law and Contemporary Problems (2005) 225, at 250-259.
55. I am grateful to Gráinne de Búrca and Benedict Kingsbury for insisting that I clarify this point.
56. But see on similar conflicts in early federal states and in the EU, Oeter, 'Souveränität und Demokratie als Problem in der "Verfassungsentwicklung" der Europäischen Union', 55 ZaöRV (1995) 659, at 664-687
57. Goldsworthy, 'The Debate About Sovereignty in the United States: A Historical and Comparative Perspective', in N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (2003), at 423
58. MacCormick, 'The Maastricht Urteil: Sovereignty Now', 1 European LJ (1995) 259.
59. I am grateful to Richard Stewart for many insights into GMO regulation and for allowing me to use his unpublished draft on 'The GMO Challenge to Global Governance of Risk' (on file with the author).
60. On the two general approaches, see ibid., at 11-16, 22-32
61. Vogel, 'The Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States', 3 Yearbook of European Environmental Law (2003) 1
62. for a cautionary note on the differences between the US and Europe, see Wiener and Rogers, 'Comparing Precaution in the United States and Europe', 5 J Risk Research (2002) 317.
63. On the development of European GMO regulation, including important differences between EU Member States, see Shaffer and Pollack, 'Regulating Between National Fears and Global Disciplines: Agricultural Biotechnology in the EU', Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/04, available at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/041001.html.
64. On the dominant role of science in the SPS Agreement and WTO decisions, see Peel, 'Risk Regulation under the WTO SPS Agreement: Science as an International Normative Yardstick?', Jean Monnet Working Paper 02/04, available at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040201.html.
65. Precautionary considerations are explicitly allowed only with respect to provisional measures in situations of insufficient scientific evidence: see Art. 5(7) of the SPS Agreement.
66. For the cases, see EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Docs. WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R (16 Jan. 1998) (hereinafter: EC Beef Hormones);
67. Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Docs. WT/DS18/AB/R (20 Oct. 1998);
68. Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, Report ofthe Appellate Body, WTO Docs. WT/DS 76/AB/R (22 Feb. 1999);
69. Japan - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WTO Docs. WT/DS245/ AB/R (26 Nov. 2003).
70. For an overview of the first three cases, see Victor, 'The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organization: An Assessment After Five Years', 32 NYU J Int'l L and Politics (2000) 865, at 895-913.
71. EC Beef Hormones, supra note 36.
72. See Howse, 'The WHO/WTO Study on Trade and Public Health: A Critical Assessment', 24 Risk Analysis (2004) 501.
73. See Howse and Mavroidis, 'Europe's Evolving Regulatory Strategy for GMOs - The Issue of Consistency with WTO Law: Of Kine and Brine', 24 Fordham Int'l LJ (2000) 317.
74. I simplify here also by treating the European constituency as 'national' for the purpose of this article. Given the tensions between the European and Member State levels within the EU, interesting constituency contests can also be observed in that framework; see, e.g., Shaffer and Pollack, supra note 34. For reasons of clarity, though, I leave them out here and focus on the central commonalities of the approaches in Europe.
75. European Communities, First Written Submission in EC - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 17 May 2004, para. 10, available at http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2004/ june/tradoc_117687.pdf.
76. See also the Press Release of 17 June 2003, available at http:// trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114665.pdf.
77. For such an interpretation see Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, supra note 1, at 36-37
78. Cassese, 'Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure', 68 Law and Contemporary Problems (2005) 109.
79. See Keohane, supra note 5, at 146-152.
80. For a similar account, see Scott, 'European Regulation of GMOs: Thinking about "Judicial Review" in the WTO', Jean Monnet Working Paper 04/04, available at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040401.html, at 12-13.
81. European Court of Justice, Judgment of 23 Nov. 1999 in Case C 149/96, Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-08395, at paras 34-49
82. Judgment of 1 Mar. 2005 in Case C-377/02, Van Parys v. Belgische Interventieen Restitutiebureau, available at http://curia.eu.int/en/ content/juris/index∀rm.htm at paras 38-54.
83. This approach is not confined to Europe: See Cottier and Nadakavukaren Schefer, 'The Relationship between World Trade Organization Law, National and Regional Law', 1 J Int'l Economic L (1998) 83, at 106-110.
84. The outcomes of actual cases indicate a more restrictive approach: See Peel, supra note 35, at 53-86.
85. See Scott, 'European Regulation of GMOs and the WTO', 9 Columbia J European L (2003) 213, at 228-229, 232-233
86. Skogstad, 'The WTO and Food Safety Regulatory Policy Innovation in the European Union', 39 J Common Market Studies (2001) 485, at 497-500.
87. For a similar assessment, see Shaffer and Pollack, supra note 34, at 41-45.
88. For a brief overview of the work of the CAC, see Victor, supra note 36, at 885-892.
89. See Scott, 'International Trade and Environmental Governance: Relating Rules (and Standards) in the EU and the WTO', 15 EJIL (2004) 307, at 331-333.
90. In Sept. 2005, the CAC had 171 member states: See http://www.codexalimentarius.net.
91. On the limited role of developing countries, see Chimni, 'Cooption and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law', IILJ Working Paper 2005/16, available at www.iilj.org/papers/2005.16Chimni.htm, at 12-17.
92. See Ostrovsky, 'The New Codex Alimentarius Commission Standards for Food Created with Modern Biotechnology: Implications for the EC GMO Framework's Compliance with the SPS Agreement', 25 Michigan J Int'l L (2004) 813, at 818-821
93. Poli, 'The European Union and the Adoption of International Food Standards within the Codex Alimentarius Commission', 10 European LJ (2004) 613, at 626-629.
94. See also the positive evaluation by ibid., at 629-630.
95. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, available at http://www.biodiv.org/ biosafety/. On the protocol and its negotiation, see M. Böckenförde, Grüne Gentechnik und Welthandel: Das Biosafety-Protokoll und seine Auswirkungen auf das Regime der WTO (2004), at 118-240
96. C. Bail, R. Falkner, and H. Marquard (eds), The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Reconciling Trade and Biotechnology with Environment and Development (2002).
97. See Stewart, supra note 33, at 56-57
98. Falkner, 'Regulating Biotech Trade: The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety', 76 Int'l Affairs (2000) 299, at 301-302, 313
99. Böckenförde, supra note 54, at 140-144.
100. The importance of the forum and its composition was highlighted, e.g., by the vigorous opposition of developing countries and the EU to the creation of a WTO Working Group on biotechnology parallel to the negotiations on the Biosafety Protocol; see Falkner, supra note 55, at 305.
101. Art. 7 of the Biosafety Protocol.
102. See especially the Preamble to and Art. 1 of the Biosafety Protocol.
103. Art. 11(8)of the Biosafety Protocol.
104. See Howse and Mavroidis, supra note 39, at 354-370
105. see also Boisson de Chazournes and Mbengue, 'GMOs and Trade: Issues at Stake in the EC Biotech Dispute', 13 Review of EC and Int'l Environmental Law (2004) 289, at 297-303
106. Böckenförde, supra note 54, at 333-336.
107. See Safrin, 'Treaties in Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade Organization Agreements', 96 AJIL (2002) 606, at 614-628
108. also Falkner, supra note 55, at 309-310.
109. See EC, First Written Submission, supra note 41, at paras 453-459.
110. See Keohane, supra note 5, 139-140.
111. See Raustiala and Victor, 'The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources', 58 Int'l Org (2004) 277, at 279, on the concept of 'regime complex'.
112. For a similar argument, see Koskenniemi and Leino, 'Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties', 15 Leiden J Int'l L (2002) 553
113. and, in the trade/environment context, O. Perez, Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism: Rethinking the Trade and Environment Complex (2004), at 259-262.
114. On EU involvement in the negotiation of the SPS Agreement, see Skogstad, supra note 47, at 492-494.
115. See Vogel, 'Trade and the Environment in the Global Economy: Contrasting European and American Perspectives', in N. Vig and M. Faure (eds), Green Giants? Environmental Policies of the United States and the European Union (2004), at 231.
116. See Poli, supra note 52.
117. For a fruitful (yet exaggerated) description of such mechanisms in terms of Luhmannian systems theory, see Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, 'Regime Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law', 25 Michigan J Int'l L (2004) 999.
118. On the relatively standard implementation of CAC standards by the EU, e.g., see Poli, supra note 52, at 616-617.
119. On the oscillation between smooth and fracturous operation of the regime complex on plant genetic resources, see Raustiala and Victor, supra note 64.
120. See also Stewart, supra note 33, at 66-67, 108-110.
121. See, e.g., Young, supra note 26, at 250.
122. See Held, supra note 26, at 235-237
123. Young, supra note 26, at 267
124. Kumm, supra note 26, at 920-924
125. O. Höffe, Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (1999), ch. 10
126. see similarly J. Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen (2004), at 131-145.
127. Historically, such contestation (of national-level authority) has often been overcome through 'nation-building' and nationalist ideologies, but at a high cost. See Connor, 'Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?', 24 World Politics (1972) 319.
128. Federal and consociational models are not necessarily opposed; in fact, they are often linked: See A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (1977), at 42. As will become clearer below, I distinguish here between federal orders in which powers are assigned to specific levels, and consociational orders in which they are shared.
129. See ibid., passim.
130. See Barry, 'Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy', 5 British J Political Science (1975) 477
131. Lusztick, 'Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism', 50 World Politics (1997) 88.
132. Lijphart, supra note 75, at 45.
133. See also the important critique by Donald Horowitz, e.g. in 'Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes', in A. Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy (2002), at 15, 19-25,
134. as well as Lijphart's rejoinder in 'The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy', in ibid., at 37, 43-44, 47-49.
135. This holds true even for most newer forms of secondary law-making, at least from a formal perspective. See Brunnée, 'COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under Multilateral Environmental Agreements', 15 Leiden J Int'l L (2002) 1, at 15-32.
136. See Scharpf, 'Die Politikverflechtungsfalle: Europäische Integration und deutscher Föderalismus im Vergleich', 26 Politische Vierteljahresschrift (1985) 323, at 324-331
137. S. Oeter, Integration und Subsidiarität im deutschen Bundesstaatsrecht (1998).
138. Scharpf, supra note 80, at 346-350.
139. Accordingly, also for Lijphart consociational orders ideally operate with no more than four main groups: See Lijphart, supra note 75, at 56.
140. As we have seen in the GMO example, in some areas the WTO severely limits national regulation in the absence of a corresponding international standard.
141. Lijphart, supra note 75, at 50.
142. For an analysis from the perspective of a changed understanding of constitutionalism (or an alternative to it), see Walker, supra note 17
143. Weiler, 'In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe's Constitutional Sonderweg', in J.H.H. Weiler and M. Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (2003), at 7
144. Maduro, 'Europe and the Constitution: What If This is as Good as it Gets?', in ibid., at 74
145. Kumm, 'The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty', 11 European LJ (2005) 262
146. see also Krisch, 'Europe's Constitutional Monstrosity', 25 Oxford J Legal Studies (2005) 321.
147. See A.-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet, and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), The European Court and National Courts-Doctrine and Jurisprudence (1998);
148. F. Mayer, Kompetenzüberschreitung und Letztentscheidung (2000).
149. See supra note 22.
150. See also Maduro, supra note 84, at 81-86.
151. See also Oeter, 'Föderalismus', in A. von Bogdandy (ed.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht (2003) at 59, 110-119.
152. On the general potential of extending the argument of domestic review of international organizations beyond the European context, see Walter, 'Grundrechtsschutz gegen Hoheitsakte internationaler Organisationen', 129 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts (2004) 39.
153. See Gutherie, 'Security Council Sanctions and the Protection of Individual Rights', 60 Annual Survey of American Law (2004) 491
154. Dyzenhaus, 'The Rule of (Administrative) Law in International Law', 68 Law and Contemporary Problems (2005) 127, at 140-150.
155. See Cramér, 'Recent Swedish Experiences with Targeted UN Sanctions: The Erosion of Trust in the Security Council', in E. de Wet and A. Nollkaemper (eds), Review of the Security Council by Member States (2003), at 85, 90-97.
156. Three months before the Committee decision, the CFI had rejected the request for provisional measures but reserved a decision on the merits: see the order of the President of the CFI of 7 May 2002 in Case T-306/ 01R, Aden et al. v. Council and Commission [2002] ECR II-02387.
157. See the judgment of the CFI of 21 Sept. 2005 in Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al-Barakaat v. Council and Commission, available at http://curia.eu.int/ en/content/juris/index_form.htm. It is under appeal to the ECJ.
158. See the judgment of the ECtHR of 30 June 2005 in App. No. 45036/98, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v. Ireland, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int.
159. On the general reserved deferral of domestic courts to UN sanctions and their implementation, see Gowlland-Debbas, 'Implementing Sanctions Resolutions in Domestic Law', in V. Gowlland-Debbas (ed.), National Implementation of United Nations Sanctions: A Comparative Study (2004), at 33, 55-65.
160. On parallel cases, see also Lammers, 'Challenging the Establishment of the ICTY before the Dutch Courts', in de Wet and Nollkaemper, supra note 91, at 107.
161. Marko, 'Challenging the Authority of the UN High Representative before the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina', in ibid., at 113.
162. See Van Vaerenbergh, 'Regulatory Features and Administrative Law Dimensions of the Olympic Movement's Anti-doping Regime', IILJ Working Paper 2005/11, available at www.iilj.org/papers/ IILJ2005.11Vaerenbergh.htm, at 17-21
163. Mattli and Büthe, supra note 30, at 257-258.
164. Other examples include conflicts over the regulation of water services: see Morgan, 'Turning Off the Tap: Urban Water Service Delivery and the Social Construction of Global Administrative Law',
165. in this issue; or, in a different mode, mutual challenges between certification regimes in sustainable forestry: See Meidinger, 'The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The Case of Forestry', in this issue.
166. See D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (2000)
167. Slaughter, supra note 24.
168. See Barr and Miller, 'Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel', in this issue.
169. See supra, text at notes 72, 73.
170. For a similar argument with respect to the EU, see Maduro, supra note 84, at 82-86.
171. See also the arguments presented supra, in sect. 2 C. Here, as there, I do not present a fully theorized argument, based on a particular normative vision, but rather an approach that might resonate with a number of different broader normative perspectives.
172. Although, in the latter case, the OECD's efforts in the area of education may reflect inroads into the national domain.
173. Basing the international order on such normative grounds is, of course, in itself problematic as it stands in tension with the strong value pluralism of international society. I cannot deal with this problem here, but the emphasis placed here on actual preferences may alleviate the general concern. On these problems with respect to global administrative law in general, see Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, supra note 1, at 42-52.
174. E.g., David Held defines autonomy as follows: 'persons should enjoy equal rights and, accordingly, equal obligations in the specification of the political framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them; ...': D. Held, Models of Democracy (2nd edn., 1996), at 301.
175. Much of Held's further specification of the principle, also with respect to global contexts, assumes particular political frameworks (along the lines of existing power-wielding institutions). But if participation is understood as an individual right (rather than the collective right of a given community), the general principle is easily applied also to the definition of the framework itself. In a related vein, Thomas Franck sees the increasing recognition of individuals' nationality choices as a reflection of their basis in autonomy: See T.M. Franck, The Empowered Self: Law and Society in the Age of Individualism (1999), at ch. 4.
176. See P.Q. Hirst (ed.), The Pluralist Theory of the State (1989), at 1-47
177. D. Nicholls, The Pluralist State: The Political Ideas of J.N. Figgis and his Contemporaries (2nd edn., 1994)
178. also D. Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State (1997).
179. See Laski, 'Law and the State', in Hirst, supra note 104, at 197, 214.
180. also Hirst, in ibid., at 28.
181. See Nicholls, supra note 104, at ch. 5
182. Hirst, supra note 104, at 28-30
183. Laski, 'The Problem of Administrative Areas', in ibid., at 131, 155.
184. See P.Q. Hirst, Associative Democracy (1994), at 47, 56-61.
185. W.A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism (2002), at ch. 9
186. in a similar vein, see Young, supra note 26, at 180-195.
187. C. Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago (2003). Kukathas bases freedom of association not on autonomy but on freedom of conscience (ibid., at 36-37); but this difference is of little importance in the present context.
188. See ibid., at ch. 6, and especially at 252 ('[t]he state should not be concerned about anything except order or peace').
189. The difference escapes Kukathas who sees international society as remaining in a mostly coordinatory mode: See ibid., at 28.
190. See ibid., at 93-114.
191. W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (1995), at ch. 8.
192. see also Kymlicka, 'The Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas', 20 Political Theory (1992) 140, at 142-143.
193. See Held, supra note 103, at 299-305.
194. P. Pettit, Republicanism (1997).
195. This does not imply that national constituencies that do not follow the model of liberal democracy would be excluded as relevant constituencies. Compared to actual alternatives, especially foreign domination, even authoritarian regimes will often have a better claim to ensure non-domination of their citizens.
196. Another way of expressing this idea is to emphasize the simultaneous origin of private and public autonomy and the mutual constitution of rights and democracy: See J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung (1992), at ch. III.
197. See also J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999), at chs 11 and 13, for whom participation is central, yet only in so far as it concerns matters of 'good-faith disagreement' and thus presumably not about the question whether everybody's participation should matter equally in principle: ibid., at 303-304. The question who decides what is 'good-faith disagreement' or 'justice' remains, of course, open here.
198. See Shapiro and Hacker-Cordón, 'Outer Edges and Inner Edges', in Shapiro and Hacker-Cordón, supra note 23, at 1.
199. See supra, sect. 2 C. As pointed out there, all of them can be defended on the basis of different broader normative approaches.
200. One might also think, e.g., of subnational groups as additional constituencies.
201. See also Waldron, supra note 115, at ch. 11, especially on Wollheim's paradox, at 246.
202. Fisher, supra note 3, at 513-514.
203. E.g., multinational water companies have changed their strategies but have not ceased to invest in developing countries in the face of unruly regulatory environments: See Morgan, supra note 95.
204. See M.G. Schmidt, Demokratietheorien (2nd edn., 1997), at 159.
205. See also the parallel critique of Kukathas' approach in the book review by Spinner-Halev, 67 Journal of Politics (2005) 595, at 596-597.
206. See Stewart, supra note 15, at 1760-1805.
207. Schmidt-Agmann, supra note 16, at 265-266.
208. On the related tendency towards a 'politicization' of the judicial process when politics becomes judicialized, see Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law', 65 Law and Contemporary Problems (2002) 41, at 63-65.
209. On dominant influence in the shaping of global regulatory institutions see Steinberg, 'In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO', 56 Int'l Org (2002) 399
210. Shaffer, 'Power, Governance, and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional Approach', in M. Barnett and R. Duvall, Power in Global Governance (2005), at 130 (on the WTO)
211. Mattli and Büthe, supra note 30 (on the setting of international accounting standards).
212. On the generally precarious position of international legal norms between reinforcing and limiting power, see Krisch, 'International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order', 16 EJIL (2005) 369.
213. For arguments along these lines, see Young, supra note 26, at 40-50, 108-120, 167-173.
214. Kukathas, supra note 108, at 164, 191-192, 268.
215. See also the discussion of counter-hegemonic, subaltern plurality in B. de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation (2nd edn., 2002), at 471-193.
216. Laski's pluralism seems to have been motivated by similar concerns: See Nicholls, supra note 104, at 86.
217. See Tully, supra note 17, at 117-124
218. Kukathas, supra note 108, at ch. 4
219. Maduro, supra note 84, at 99-100
220. Young, supra note 26, at ch. 2.
221. See ibid., at 35-36.
222. See Weiler, supra note 84, at 18-23.
223. See supra, sect. 3 B.
224. See Weiler, 'The Geology of International Law - Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy', 64 ZaöRV (2004) 547.
225. See Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, supra note 1, at 48-19.
226. For an attempt at conceptualizing non-electoral accountability mechanisms, see Macdonald and Macdonald, 'Non-Electoral Accountability in Global Politics: Strengthening Democratic Control in the Global Garment Industry', in this issue.