The political form of the constitution: The separation of powers, rights and representative democracy

Political Studies

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 436-456

  Bellamy, Richard ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040898820     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00593.x     Document Type: Review

References (165)

1. I am grateful to Terrence Ball, Dario Castiglione, Stephen Elkin, Michael Moran, Timothy O'Hagan, and John Zvesper for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.
2. Article 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 1789, as reproduced in English translation in S. E. Finer, V. Bogdanor and B. Rudden, Comparing Constitutions (Oxford, Clarendon, 1995), p. 210.
3. For this formulation of the nature of the constitution, see Luigi Ferrajoli, 'Democracy and the constitution in Italy', this volume.
4. Ronald Dworkin, for example, recently defined constitutionalism as no more than 'a system that establishes legal rights that the dominant legislature does not have the power to override or compromise', and remarks how 'constitutionalism so understood is an increasingly popular political phenomenon'. R. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and democracy', European Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1995), p. 2.
5. As Maurice Vile notes in his Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford, Clarendon, 1967), p. 2,
6. 'The doctrine of the separation of powers finds its roots in the ancient world', where, to the extent the idea existed at all, the constitution of the body politic, as in the human body, referred to its nature, character or form. On this last point, see C. H. McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1940), ch. II.
7. Ronald Dworkin is the clearest exponent of this view, e.g. Law's Empire (London, Fontana, 1986) and A Matter of Principle (Oxford, Clarendon, 1985). Recently, however, John Rawls would appear to have embraced a similar position, see Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), lecture VI. B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, MA. Belknap, 1991) and C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993), are among contemporary commentators who adopt a view of the American Constitution nearer to that advocated here than Dworkin, Law's Empire or Rawls, Political Liberalism. See R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, 'Constitutionalism and democracy: political theory and the American constitution', British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming, for a critical comparison of these two groups of writers The key historical discussion is of course J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ and London, Princeton University Press, 1975). It is worth underlining that I do not treat liberalism and republicanism as exclusive categories, my aim is merely to place the emphasis on the latter and note how it frames the former. For a discussion of the ways liberalism and republicanism have overlapped historically see J. Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. liberalism: a reconsideration', History of Political Thought, 9 (1988), 349-77.
8. Ronald Dworkin is the clearest exponent of this view, e.g. Law's Empire (London, Fontana, 1986) and A Matter of Principle (Oxford, Clarendon, 1985). Recently, however, John Rawls would appear to have embraced a similar position, see Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), lecture VI. B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, MA. Belknap, 1991) and C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993), are among contemporary commentators who adopt a view of the American Constitution nearer to that advocated here than Dworkin, Law's Empire or Rawls, Political Liberalism. See R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, 'Constitutionalism and democracy: political theory and the American constitution', British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming, for a critical comparison of these two groups of writers The key historical discussion is of course J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ and London, Princeton University Press, 1975). It is worth underlining that I do not treat liberalism and republicanism as exclusive categories, my aim is merely to place the emphasis on the latter and note how it frames the former. For a discussion of the ways liberalism and republicanism have overlapped historically see J. Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. liberalism: a reconsideration', History of Political Thought, 9 (1988), 349-77.
9. Ronald Dworkin is the clearest exponent of this view, e.g. Law's Empire (London, Fontana, 1986) and A Matter of Principle (Oxford, Clarendon, 1985). Recently, however, John Rawls would appear to have embraced a similar position, see Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), lecture VI. B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, MA. Belknap, 1991) and C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993), are among contemporary commentators who adopt a view of the American Constitution nearer to that advocated here than Dworkin, Law's Empire or Rawls, Political Liberalism. See R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, 'Constitutionalism and democracy: political theory and the American constitution', British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming, for a critical comparison of these two groups of writers The key historical discussion is of course J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ and London, Princeton University Press, 1975). It is worth underlining that I do not treat liberalism and republicanism as exclusive categories, my aim is merely to place the emphasis on the latter and note how it frames the former. For a discussion of the ways liberalism and republicanism have overlapped historically see J. Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. liberalism: a reconsideration', History of Political Thought, 9 (1988), 349-77.
10. Ronald Dworkin is the clearest exponent of this view, e.g. Law's Empire (London, Fontana, 1986) and A Matter of Principle (Oxford, Clarendon, 1985). Recently, however, John Rawls would appear to have embraced a similar position, see Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), lecture VI. B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, MA. Belknap, 1991) and C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993), are among contemporary commentators who adopt a view of the American Constitution nearer to that advocated here than Dworkin, Law's Empire or Rawls, Political Liberalism. See R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, 'Constitutionalism and democracy: political theory and the American constitution', British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming, for a critical comparison of these two groups of writers The key historical discussion is of course J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ and London, Princeton University Press, 1975). It is worth underlining that I do not treat liberalism and republicanism as exclusive categories, my aim is merely to place the emphasis on the latter and note how it frames the former. For a discussion of the ways liberalism and republicanism have overlapped historically see J. Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. liberalism: a reconsideration', History of Political Thought, 9 (1988), 349-77.
11. Ronald Dworkin is the clearest exponent of this view, e.g. Law's Empire (London, Fontana, 1986) and A Matter of Principle (Oxford, Clarendon, 1985). Recently, however, John Rawls would appear to have embraced a similar position, see Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), lecture VI. B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, MA. Belknap, 1991) and C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993), are among contemporary commentators who adopt a view of the American Constitution nearer to that advocated here than Dworkin, Law's Empire or Rawls, Political Liberalism. See R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, 'Constitutionalism and democracy: political theory and the American constitution', British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming, for a critical comparison of these two groups of writers The key historical discussion is of course J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ and London, Princeton University Press, 1975). It is worth underlining that I do not treat liberalism and republicanism as exclusive categories, my aim is merely to place the emphasis on the latter and note how it frames the former. For a discussion of the ways liberalism and republicanism have overlapped historically see J. Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. liberalism: a reconsideration', History of Political Thought, 9 (1988), 349-77.
12. Ronald Dworkin is the clearest exponent of this view, e.g. Law's Empire (London, Fontana, 1986) and A Matter of Principle (Oxford, Clarendon, 1985). Recently, however, John Rawls would appear to have embraced a similar position, see Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), lecture VI. B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, MA. Belknap, 1991) and C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993), are among contemporary commentators who adopt a view of the American Constitution nearer to that advocated here than Dworkin, Law's Empire or Rawls, Political Liberalism. See R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, 'Constitutionalism and democracy: political theory and the American constitution', British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming, for a critical comparison of these two groups of writers The key historical discussion is of course J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ and London, Princeton University Press, 1975). It is worth underlining that I do not treat liberalism and republicanism as exclusive categories, my aim is merely to place the emphasis on the latter and note how it frames the former. For a discussion of the ways liberalism and republicanism have overlapped historically see J. Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. liberalism: a reconsideration', History of Political Thought, 9 (1988), 349-77.
13. Ronald Dworkin is the clearest exponent of this view, e.g. Law's Empire (London, Fontana, 1986) and A Matter of Principle (Oxford, Clarendon, 1985). Recently, however, John Rawls would appear to have embraced a similar position, see Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), lecture VI. B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, MA. Belknap, 1991) and C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993), are among contemporary commentators who adopt a view of the American Constitution nearer to that advocated here than Dworkin, Law's Empire or Rawls, Political Liberalism. See R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, 'Constitutionalism and democracy: political theory and the American constitution', British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming, for a critical comparison of these two groups of writers The key historical discussion is of course J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ and London, Princeton University Press, 1975). It is worth underlining that I do not treat liberalism and republicanism as exclusive categories, my aim is merely to place the emphasis on the latter and note how it frames the former. For a discussion of the ways liberalism and republicanism have overlapped historically see J. Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. liberalism: a reconsideration', History of Political Thought, 9 (1988), 349-77.
14. Ronald Dworkin is the clearest exponent of this view, e.g. Law's Empire (London, Fontana, 1986) and A Matter of Principle (Oxford, Clarendon, 1985). Recently, however, John Rawls would appear to have embraced a similar position, see Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), lecture VI. B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, MA. Belknap, 1991) and C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993), are among contemporary commentators who adopt a view of the American Constitution nearer to that advocated here than Dworkin, Law's Empire or Rawls, Political Liberalism. See R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, 'Constitutionalism and democracy: political theory and the American constitution', British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming, for a critical comparison of these two groups of writers The key historical discussion is of course J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ and London, Princeton University Press, 1975). It is worth underlining that I do not treat liberalism and republicanism as exclusive categories, my aim is merely to place the emphasis on the latter and note how it frames the former. For a discussion of the ways liberalism and republicanism have overlapped historically see J. Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. liberalism: a reconsideration', History of Political Thought, 9 (1988), 349-77.
15. Ronald Dworkin is the clearest exponent of this view, e.g. Law's Empire (London, Fontana, 1986) and A Matter of Principle (Oxford, Clarendon, 1985). Recently, however, John Rawls would appear to have embraced a similar position, see Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), lecture VI. B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, MA. Belknap, 1991) and C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993), are among contemporary commentators who adopt a view of the American Constitution nearer to that advocated here than Dworkin, Law's Empire or Rawls, Political Liberalism. See R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, 'Constitutionalism and democracy: political theory and the American constitution', British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming, for a critical comparison of these two groups of writers The key historical discussion is of course J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ and London, Princeton University Press, 1975). It is worth underlining that I do not treat liberalism and republicanism as exclusive categories, my aim is merely to place the emphasis on the latter and note how it frames the former. For a discussion of the ways liberalism and republicanism have overlapped historically see J. Isaac, 'Republicanism vs. liberalism: a reconsideration', History of Political Thought, 9 (1988), 349-77.
16. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, pp. 13-8.
17. The following list differs in certain ways from, but is compatible with, the five reasons that have been given for employing the doctrine recorded by W. B. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: an Analysis of the Doctrine from its Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), pp. 127-8.
18. J. Locke (P. Laslett, ed.), Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), The Second Treatise of Government (hereafter II), paras 143-4.
19. J. Locke (P. Laslett, ed.), Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), The Second Treatise of Government (hereafter II), paras 143-4.
20. Locke, Two Treatises, II, paras 87, 91.
21. T. Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), chs 18 and 29.
22. Locke, Two Treatises, II, paras 88-93.
23. Locke, Two Treatises, II, paras 149-50, 20, 91. Locke, of course, only distinguishes legislative and executive power. In part, this is precisely because the judiciary exercises the subordinate role of executing rather than making law. However, it is clear that he fully appreciated the importance of having the criminal and civil cases decided by 'known authorized judges' who are distinct both from the legislature and the executive (II, 20, 131, 136, 214).
24. Vile, Constitutionalism, pp. 318-21.
25. These difficulties are analysed in R. Bellamy, 'Citizenship and rights' in R. Bellamy (ed.), Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993), ch. 3; and J. Waldron, 'A right-based critique of constitutional rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51.
26. These difficulties are analysed in R. Bellamy, 'Citizenship and rights' in R. Bellamy (ed.), Theories and Concepts of Politics (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993), ch. 3; and J. Waldron, 'A right-based critique of constitutional rights', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1993), 18-51.
27. For an analysis of these difficulties with regard to the European Convention on Human Rights see R. Bellamy, 'The constitution of Europe: rights or democracy?' in R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione (eds), Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe (London, Lothian Foundation, 1995), ch. 11.
28. Vile, Constitutionalism, p. 76; Gwyn, Separation of Powers, p. 100.
29. Vile, Constitutionalism, p. 76; Gwyn, Separation of Powers, p. 100.
30. See in particular, Polybius (I. Scott-Kilvert, trans., F. W. Walbank, ed.), The Rise of the Roman Empire (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1979), bk VI, chs 3, 4 and 10, pp. 303-5, 310-1. For a clear discussion of book VI, see F. W. Walbank, Polybius (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972), ch. V.
31. See in particular, Polybius (I. Scott-Kilvert, trans., F. W. Walbank, ed.), The Rise of the Roman Empire (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1979), bk VI, chs 3, 4 and 10, pp. 303-5, 310-1. For a clear discussion of book VI, see F. W. Walbank, Polybius (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972), ch. V.
32. E.g. see the discussion of the Roman constitution in Polybius, Rise of the Roman Empire, bk VI, chs 11-18, pp. 311-8.
33. W. Nippel, 'Ancient and modern republicanism: "mixed constitution" and "ephors"', in B. Fontana (ed.), The Invention of the Modern Republic (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 9.
34. The issue is complicated by the fact that different governmental bodies did not necessarily represent different social classes. See in this regard Nippel's comments on the ephorate in the Spartan system in his 'Ancient and modern republicanism', pp. 8-10.
35. Nippel, 'Ancient and modern republicanism', pp. 7-8, 9.
36. See Aristotle (T. A. Sinclair, trans., T. J. Saunders, ed.), The Politics (Harmondsworth, Penguin, rev. ed., 1981), bk. III, ch. 7, 1279a22-1279b4; bk.IV, chs 2, 3, 8, 9, 1289a26-1290a13, 1293b22-1294b41.
37. N. Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio in N. Machiavelli (S. Bertelli, ed.), Il Principe e Discorsi (Milan, Feltrinelli, 1960), bk. I, Ch. 4, p. 137.
38. N. Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio in N. Machiavelli (S. Bertelli, ed.), Il Principe e Discorsi (Milan, Feltrinelli, 1960), bk. I, Ch. 4, p. 137.
39. Machiavelli, Discorsi, bk. I, chs 37, p. 218.
40. Machiavelli, Discorsi, bk. I, chs 17, p. 178.
41. Machiavelli, Discorsi, bk. I, chs 16-18, pp. 173-83.
42. Machiavelli, Discorsi, bk. I, ch. 55, p. 258.
43. Machiavelli, Discorsi, bk. I, ch. 58, pp. 261-6; bk. II, ch. 2, p. 280.
44. For details, see Gwyn, Separation of Powers, ch. II; Vile, Constitutionalism, pp. 36-40; Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, pp. 361-6.
45. For details, see Gwyn, Separation of Powers, ch. II; Vile, Constitutionalism, pp. 36-40; Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, pp. 361-6.
46. For details, see Gwyn, Separation of Powers, ch. II; Vile, Constitutionalism, pp. 36-40; Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, pp. 361-6.
47. The King's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions, 18 June 1642, in J. P. Kenyon (ed.), The Stuart Constitution: Documents and Commentary (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 21.
48. The King's Answer, p. 21.
49. J. Filmer, 'The anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy' in J. P. Somerville, (ed.), Patriarcha and Other Political Works of Sir Robert Filmer (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991).
50. See Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, p. 388,
51. and Pocock's introduction to his edition of The Political Works of James Harrington (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 15-42. Pocock describes Harrington (p. 15) as 'England's premier civic humanist and Machiavellian'.
52. Harrington, Political Writings, pp. 163-5.
53. Harrington, Political Writings, pp. 171-4.
54. See Vile, Constitutionalism, pp. 37-52;
55. Gywn, Separation of Powers, chs III and IV.
56. P. Hunton's A Treatise of Monarchy (1648) was of particular importance in this regard. The relevant sections are reproduced in D. Wootton (ed.), Divine Right and Democracy: an Anthology of Political Writing in Stuart England (Hamondsworth, Penguin, 1986), pp. 191-5.
57. It was included in part in the 1653 Instrument of Government and later defences of the Commonwealth. The key text here is M. Needham's The Excellencie of a Free-State (1656) , an extract from which appears as Appendix 1 of Gwyn, Separation of Powers, pp. 131-3.
58. It was included in part in the 1653 Instrument of Government and later defences of the Commonwealth. The key text here is M. Needham's The Excellencie of a Free-State (1656) , an extract from which appears as Appendix 1 of Gwyn, Separation of Powers, pp. 131-3.
59. Many of the peculiarities of Locke's account arise from his adherence to the existing arrangements of the English constitution. See Vile, Constitutionalism, pp. 58-67,
60. and Gwyn, Separation of Powers, ch. V.
61. On Bolingbroke, see Vile, Constitutionalism, pp. 72-5. R. Shackleton, Montesquieu: a Critical Biography (Oxford, Clarendon, 1961), pp. 298-300 notes that, along with Locke, he was probably the most important influence on Montesquieu's conception of the English Constitution.
62. On Bolingbroke, see Vile, Constitutionalism, pp. 72-5. R. Shackleton, Montesquieu: a Critical Biography (Oxford, Clarendon, 1961), pp. 298-300 notes that, along with Locke, he was probably the most important influence on Montesquieu's conception of the English Constitution.
63. C.-L. de S. Montesquieu, De l'esprit des lois, 2 vols (Paris, Garnier-Flammarion, 1979), I, bk. XI, ch. 3, p. 292.
64. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 4, p. 293.
65. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 4, p. 293.
66. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, p. 294.
67. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, p. 294.
68. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, p. 295.
69. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, p. 296.
70. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, p. 295.
71. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, p. 299.
72. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, p. 299.
73. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, p. 298.
74. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, pp. 298-9.
75. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, pp. 300-1.
76. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, p. 297.
77. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 2, p. 292.
78. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, p. 297.
79. Harrington, Political Works, pp. 172, 174.
80. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, p. 297.
81. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 27, pp. 478-9.
82. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, p. 302.
83. Montesquieu appears to have been misled as to the importance of professional judges in England. See M. Richter, The Political Theory of Montesquieu (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 336 n. 15.
84. Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, pp. 296, 298.
85. E.g. E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 60 (on rights); and 'An appeal from the old to the new Whigs', excerpted in I. Hampshire-Monk, (ed.), The Political Philosophy of Edmund Burke (Harlow, Longman, 1987), p. 257 (on Britain's mixed constitution).
86. E.g. E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 60 (on rights); and 'An appeal from the old to the new Whigs', excerpted in I. Hampshire-Monk, (ed.), The Political Philosophy of Edmund Burke (Harlow, Longman, 1987), p. 257 (on Britain's mixed constitution).
87. The importance of the distinction between organic and contractual metaphors of the state for understanding the history of political concepts has been stressed by T. Ball, e.g. his article on 'Party', in T. Ball, J. Farr and R. L. Hanson (eds), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), especially pp. 164-7. I am grateful to him for underlining its relevance for the present subject in written comments on an earlier version of this chapter.
88. T. Paine, Rights of Man, Part I in B. Kuklick (ed.), Political Writings (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 78-92.
89. J. Bodin, The Six Books of a Commonweale, R. Knolles (trans.), K. D. McRae (ed.) (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1962), bk. II, ch. 1; Filmer, 'The anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy'; and Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 225.
90. J. Bodin, The Six Books of a Commonweale, R. Knolles (trans.), K. D. McRae (ed.) (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1962), bk. II, ch. 1; Filmer, 'The anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy'; and Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 225.
91. J. Bodin, The Six Books of a Commonweale, R. Knolles (trans.), K. D. McRae (ed.) (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1962), bk. II, ch. 1; Filmer, 'The anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy'; and Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 225.
92. For Mill senior's trenchant critique of the doctrine of mixed government and constitutional balance, see J. Mill, Essay on Government, ch. V in J. Mill (T. Ball, ed.), Political Writings (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 17-20.
93. B. Manin, 'Checks, balances and boundaries: the separation of powers in the constitutional debate of 1787', in Fontana, The Invention of the Modern Republic, p. 27.
94. The Antifederalist position is neatly summarized in Manin, 'Checks, balances and boundaries', pp. 34-47.
95. See in particular the essays collected in T. Ball and J. G. A. Pocock (eds), Conceptual Change and the Constitution (Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1988).
96. It is true to say, however, that a certain exasperation is sometimes discernable in the remarks of Hamilton and Madison on the Antifederalists' 'oracle', the 'celebrated Montesquieu'. See A. Hamilton, J. Madison and J. Jay, The Federalist (London, Dent, 1992), no. 9, p. 38; no. 47, p. 247; no. 78, p. 388.
97. It is true to say, however, that a certain exasperation is sometimes discernable in the remarks of Hamilton and Madison on the Antifederalists' 'oracle', the 'celebrated Montesquieu'. See A. Hamilton, J. Madison and J. Jay, The Federalist (London, Dent, 1992), no. 9, p. 38; no. 47, p. 247; no. 78, p. 388.
98. It is true to say, however, that a certain exasperation is sometimes discernable in the remarks of Hamilton and Madison on the Antifederalists' 'oracle', the 'celebrated Montesquieu'. See A. Hamilton, J. Madison and J. Jay, The Federalist (London, Dent, 1992), no. 9, p. 38; no. 47, p. 247; no. 78, p. 388.
99. Federalist, no. 47, p. 248.
100. Federalist, no. 37, p. 180.
101. Locke, Two Treatises, II, paras 159-60; Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, pp. 299-300.
102. Locke, Two Treatises, II, paras 159-60; Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, pp. 299-300.
103. Locke, Two Treatises, II, paras 149-50; Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, p. 300. Federalist, no. 48, p. 255.
104. Locke, Two Treatises, II, paras 149-50; Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, p. 300. Federalist, no. 48, p. 255.
105. Locke, Two Treatises, II, paras 149-50; Montesquieu, de l'esprit, bk. XI, ch. 6, p. 300. Federalist, no. 48, p. 255.
106. Federalist, no. 10, p. 41.
107. Federalist, no. 10, p. 43.
108. Federalist, no. 10, p. 44.
109. Federalist, no. 10, pp. 41-2.
110. Federalist, no. 47, pp. 249-53.
111. Federalist, no. 48, pp. 255-7.
112. Federalist, no. 48, pp. 254, 257; no. 51.
113. Federalist, no. 48, pp. 254, 257; no. 51.
114. Federalist, no. 51, p. 265.
115. Federalist, no. 51, p. 266
116. Federalist, no. 57, p. 293.
117. See D. G. Adair, '"That politics may be reduced to a science": David Hume, James Madison and the Tenth Federalist', Huntingdon Library Quarterly, XX (1957), 343-60, and Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, ch. XV.
118. See D. G. Adair, '"That politics may be reduced to a science": David Hume, James Madison and the Tenth Federalist', Huntingdon Library Quarterly, XX (1957), 343-60, and Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, ch. XV.
119. T. Ball, '"A Republic - if you can keep it"', in Ball and Pocock, Conceptual Change and the Constitution, pp. 137-64.
120. As G. Brennan and A. Hamlin show in their chapter in this volume, these three benefits are associated with an economical approach to constitutionalism and follow from employing what they call the sanctioning, screening and summative mechanisms respectively.
121. The Aristotelian dimension of the Federalists' thought has been stressed in a number of recent commentaries. See D. Epstein, The Political Theory of The Federalist (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1984), pp. 124f; and J. Zvesper, 'Interpreting The Federalist' in R.C. Simmons (ed.), The United States Constitution: the First 200 Years (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1989), pp. 62-4.
122. The Aristotelian dimension of the Federalists' thought has been stressed in a number of recent commentaries. See D. Epstein, The Political Theory of The Federalist (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1984), pp. 124f; and J. Zvesper, 'Interpreting The Federalist' in R.C. Simmons (ed.), The United States Constitution: the First 200 Years (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1989), pp. 62-4.
123. Federalist, no. 14, pp. 62-3.
124. Federalist, no. 10, p. 42.
125. Federalist, no. 51, p. 265.
126. Federalist, no. 51, p. 266.
127. Federalist, no. 51, p. 268.
128. Federalist, no. 51, pp. 266-7.
129. Federalist, no. 63, p. 324.
130. R. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 22.
131. Federalist, no. 10, p. 46.
132. Federalist, no. 70, pp. 360, 363.
133. For a critique of the Dahlian thesis in this respect, see R. J. Morgan, 'Madison's Theory of Representation in the Tenth Federalist', Journal of Politics, 36 (1974), 852-85. Vile's Constitutionalism is largely motivated by an attack on Dahl's behaviourial approach, see ch. XI.
134. For a critique of the Dahlian thesis in this respect, see R. J. Morgan, 'Madison's Theory of Representation in the Tenth Federalist', Journal of Politics, 36 (1974), 852-85. Vile's Constitutionalism is largely motivated by an attack on Dahl's behaviourial approach, see ch. XI.
135. Federalist, no. 68, pp. 349-52.
136. Federalist, no. 69, p. 353.
137. Federalist, no. 68, p. 349.
138. Federalist, no. 70, pp. 359-66.
139. Federalist, no. 69, pp. 355-7.
140. Federalist, no. 51, pp. 265-6.
141. Manin, 'Checks, balances and boundaries', p. 56. Manin observes that this provision was to fall into virtually complete disuse but illuminates the Federalist plan of allowing all branches of government a share in each other's functions.
142. Brutus had argued that 'The judicial power will operate to effect, in the most certain, yet silent and perceptible manner, what is evidently the tendency of the constitution: I mean, the entire subversion of the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the individual states'. H. J. Storing (ed.), The Antifederalist: Writing by Opponents of the Constitution (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 165.
143. Federalist, no. 78, pp. 398-9.
144. Federalist, no. 78, pp. 400-1.
145. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations, pp. 191-5.
146. Federalist, no. 49, p. 260.
147. Federalist, no. 81, pp. 414-5.
148. In letters to J. Madison of 6 September 1789 and to S. Kercheval of 12 July 1816, in M. Peterson (ed.), The Portable Thomas Jefferson (New York, Viking, 1975), pp. 444-51, 552-61.
149. It is worth noting that initially Madison himself had preferred legislative to judicial review of the constitution on the grounds that it 'can never be proper' for the judicial branch to be paramount to the legislative. R. A. Rutland et al. (eds), Papers of James Madison, vol. 11 (Chalottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1977), p. 293.
150. Federalist, no. 49, p. 261.
151. Federalist, no. 49, p. 259.
152. Alex de Tocqueville, De la democratie en Amerique (Paris, Garnier-Flammarion, 1981) vol. I, ch. VI, pp. 170-1.
153. For a critique, see Bellamy and Castiglione, 'Constitutionalism and democracy', section IV.
154. Federalist, no. 84, p. 444.
155. Federalist, no. 84, p. 443.
156. E.g. Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and democracy', p. 11.
157. Federalist, no. 84, p. 442.
158. J. Madison, Letter to T. Jefferson 17 October 1788, in M. Meyers (ed.), The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison (Hanover and London, University Press of New England, 1981), p. 158.
159. Madison, Letter to T. Jefferson, p. 156; Speech in the House of Representatives, 8 June 1789, in Mind of the Founder, p. 169.
160. Madison, Letter to T. Jefferson, p. 156; Speech in the House of Representatives, 8 June 1789, in Mind of the Founder, p. 169.
161. For further evidence to this effect, see V. Hart's account of the minimum wage campaign, 'Righting wrongs: the normality of constitutional politics' in R. Bellamy (ed.), Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Aldershot, Avebury, 1996), pp. 45-60.
162. For these problems, see J. Raz, 'The rule of law and its virtue' in his The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford, Clarendon, 1979), ch. 11.
163. For this thesis, see U. Preuß's 1995 Austin Lecture, 'The political meaning of constitutionalism' in Bellamy, Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty, ch. 2.
164. For attempts to develop this kind of approach, see Stephen Elkin's chapter in this volume; S. Elkin and K. E. Soltan (eds), A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993); and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, 'The communitarian ghost in the cosmopolitan machine: constitutionalism, democracy and the reconfiguration of politics in the new Europe' in Bellamy, Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty, ch. 8.
165. For attempts to develop this kind of approach, see Stephen Elkin's chapter in this volume; S. Elkin and K. E. Soltan (eds), A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993); and R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione, 'The communitarian ghost in the cosmopolitan machine: constitutionalism, democracy and the reconfiguration of politics in the new Europe' in Bellamy, Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty, ch. 8.