Computational methods for oblivious equilibrium

Operations Research

Volumn 58, Issue 4 PART 2, 2010, Pages 1247-1265

  Weintraub, Gabriel Y ^a   Lanier Benkard, C ^b   Van Roy, Benjamin ^c  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Dynamic programming optimal control; Games group decisions; Markov; Stochastic

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION ERRORS; DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING/OPTIMAL CONTROL; GAMES/GROUP DECISIONS; IMPERFECT COMPETITION; MARKOV; NEW SOLUTIONS; RANDOM SHOCKS; STOCHASTIC;

COMPETITION; COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY; DYNAMIC MODELS; STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 77955886658     PISSN: 0030364X     EISSN: 15265463     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1090.0790     Document Type: Article

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