A model of collusion timing

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 351-387

  De Roos, Nicolas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Collusion; Dynamic games; Entry; Rules of thumb

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; GAME THEORY; INVESTMENTS; PROFESSIONAL ASPECTS;

COLLUSION; DYNAMIC GAMES; ENTRY; RULE OF THUMB;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 1242300169     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2003.10.003     Document Type: Article

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