Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 261-292

  Dindoš, Martin ^a   Mezzetti, Claudio ^b  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Aggregative games; Better reply dynamics; Strategic complements; Strategic substitutes; Weak finite improvement property

Indexed keywords

EID: 31844455776     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.12.001     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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