Snowball: A dynamic oligopoly model with indirect network effects

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 909-938

  Markovich, Sarit ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Dynamics; Market structure; Network effects; Oligopoly

Indexed keywords

EID: 38949159733     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2007.04.005     Document Type: Article

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