Management economics in a large retail company

Management Science

Volumn 56, Issue 8, 2010, Pages 1398-1414

  Siebert, W Stanley ^a   Zubanov, Nikolay ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Business economics; Compensation methods; Firm behavior; Management; Productivity

Indexed keywords

BUSINESS ECONOMICS; COMPENSATION METHOD; FIRM BEHAVIOR; MANAGEMENT ECONOMICS; MANAGEMENT PRACTICES; NEGATIVE DEVIATIONS;

INDUSTRY; MANAGERS; PRODUCTIVITY; SALES;

MANAGEMENT;

EID: 77955634465     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1100.1188     Document Type: Article

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