Limited and online supply and the Bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 41-49

  Devanur, Nikhil R ^a   Hartline, Jason D ^b  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b Northwestern University   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction; Limited supply; Mechanism design; Online; Prior free

Indexed keywords

BAYESIAN; INTERNET ADVERTISING; MECHANISM DESIGN; ON-LINE FASHION; OPTIMAL MECHANISM; RANDOM SAMPLING;

BAYESIAN NETWORKS; ELECTRIC CONDUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 77950583486     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1566374.1566381     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (13)

1. S. Alaei, A. Malekian, and A. Srinivasan. On random sampling auctions for digital goods. In Proc. 11th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce, 2009.
2. M. Babaio, L. Blumrosen, and A. Roth. Auctions with online supply. Working paper.
3. S. Baliga and R. Vohra. Market research and market design. Advances in Theoretical Economics, 3, 2003.
4. S. Chakraborty and N. Devanur. An Online Multi-unit Auction with Improved Competitive Ratio. ArXiv e-prints, January 2009.
5. U. Feige, A. Flaxman, J. Hartline, and R. Kleinberg. On the Competitive Ratio of the Random Sampling Auction. In Proc. 1st Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, pages 878-886, 2005.
6. A. Fiat, A. Goldberg, J. Hartline, and A. Karlin. Generalized competitive auctions. In Proc. 34th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, pages 72-81. ACM Press, 2002.
7. A. V. Goldberg, J. D. Hartline, A. Karlin, M. Saks, and A. Wright. Competitive auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 55:242-269, 2006.
8. A. V. Goldberg, J. D. Hartline, and A. Wright. Competitive auctions and digital goods. In Proc. 12th ACM Symp. on Discrete Algorithms, pages 735-744. ACM/SIAM, 2001.
9. J. Hartline and A. Karlin. Profit maximization in mechanism design. In N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, editors, Algorithmic Game Theory, chapter 13, pages 331-362. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
10. J. Hartline and R. McGrew. From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 175-182, 2005.
11. J. Hartline and T. Roughgarden. Optimal mechanism design and money burning. In Proc. 39th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, 2008.
12. M. Mahdian and A. Saberi. Multi-unit auctions with unknown supply. In Proc. 8th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce, 2006.
13. R. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6:58-73, 1981.