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Volumn 62, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 422-458

Choosing to target: What types of countries get different types of world bank projects

(1)  Winters, Matthew S a  

a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AID FLOW; DEVELOPMENT AID; DEVELOPMENT PROJECT; LENDING BEHAVIOR; WORLD BANK;

EID: 77954663166     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: 10863338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0043887110000092     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (64)

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