The politics of effective foreign aid

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 13, Issue , 2010, Pages 61-80

  Wright, Joseph ^a   Winters, Matthew ^a  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Exogeneity; Growth; Political institutions

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952945512     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.032708.143524     Document Type: Article

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