Strategic interaction and interstate crises: A Bayesian Quantal Response estimator for incomplete information games

Political Analysis

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 250-273

  Esarey, Justin ^a   Mukherjee, Bumba ^b   Moore, Will H ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 47649113108     PISSN: 10471987     EISSN: 14764989     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpm037     Document Type: Article

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