Statistical backwards induction: A simple method for estimating recursive strategic models

Political Analysis

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 21-40

  Bas, Muhammet Ali ^a   Signorino, Curtis S ^b   Walker, Robert W ^c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^c WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 42549164185     PISSN: 10471987     EISSN: 14764989     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpm029     Document Type: Article

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