Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 48, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 154-172

  McGillivray, Fiona ^a   Stam, Allan C ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Dartmouth College   (United States)

Author keywords

Coercive diplomacy; Democratic leadership; Economic sanctions; Nondemocratic leadership; Policy change; Sender state; Target state

Indexed keywords

EID: 1842586447     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002703262858     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. Alesina, A., and H. Rosenthal. 1995. Partisan politics, divided government, and the economy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
2. Allison, P. 1984. Event history analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
3. Baldwin, D. A. 1985. Economic statecraft. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
4. Bennett, D. S. 1999. Parametric models, duration dependence, and time-varying data revisited. American Journal of Political Science 43:256-70.
5. Bennett, D. S., and A. C. Stam. 1996. The duration of interstate Wars. American Political Science Review 90:239-57.
6. _. 2000. EUGene: A conceptual manual. International Interactions 26:179-204.
7. Bienen, H., and N. Van de Walle. 1991. Of time and power: Leadership duration in the modern world. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
8. Bolks, S. M., and D. Al-Sowayel. 2000. How long do economic sanctions last? Examining the sanctioning process through duration. Political Research Quarterly 53:241-65.
9. Bueno de Mesquita, B. 1981. The war trap. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
10. Bueno de Mesquita, B., J. D. Morrow, R. Siverson, and A. Smith. 2002. Political institutions, policy choice and the survival of leaders. British Journal of Political Science 32 (4): 559-90.
11. Bueno de Mesquita, B., and R. Siverson. 1995. War and the survival of political leaders: A comparative study of regime types and political accountability. American Political Science Review 89:841-55.
12. Bueno de Mesquita, B., A. Smith, R. M. Siverson, and J. D. Morrow. 2003. The logic of political survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
13. Bunce, V. 1981. Do new leaders make a difference? Executive succession and public policy under capitalism and socialism. Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press.
14. Cox, G. 1990. Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems. American Journal of Political Science 34:903-35.
15. Dashti-Gibson J., P. Davis, and B. Radcliff. 1997. On the determinants of success of economic sanctions: An empirical analysis. American Journal of Political Science 41:608-18.
16. Diermeier, D., and R. Stevenson. 2000. Cabinet terminations and critical events. American Political Science Review 94:627-40.
17. Dorussen, H., and J. Mo. 2001. Ending economic sanctions: Audience costs and rent-seeking as commitment strategies. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45:395-427.
18. Downs, A. 1957. An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
19. Doxey, M. 1987. A framework for analysis with special reference to the UN and Southern Africa. International Organization 26:527-50.
20. Drezner, D. 1999. The sanctions paradox. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
21. _. 2000. Bargaining, enforcement and multilateral economic sanctions. International Organization 54:73-102.
22. Fearon, James D. 1997. Signaling foreign policy interests: tying hands versus sinking costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41:68-90.
23. Galtung, J. 1967. On the effects of economic sanctions. World Politics 19:378-416.
24. Goemans, H. E. 2000. Fighting for survival: The fate of leaders and the duration of war. Journal of Conflict Resolution 44:555-80.
25. Gordon, S. C. 2002. Stochastic dependence in competing risks. American Journal of Political Science 46:200-17.
26. Gowa, Joanne. 1999. Ballots and bullets: The elusive democratic peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
27. Greene, William H. 1993. Econometric analysis. 3rd ed. New York: Macmillan.
28. Guisinger, A., and A. Smith. 2002. Honest threats: The interaction of reputation and political institutions in international crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46:172-200.
29. Hart, R. A., Jr. 2000. Democracy and the successful use of economic sanctions. Political Research Quarterly 53:267-84.
30. Hass, R. N., ed. 1998. Economic sanctions and American diplomacy. Washington, DC: Brookings University Press.
31. Hass, R. N., and M. L. O'Sullivan, eds. 2000. Honey and vinegar. Washington, DC: Brookings University Press.
32. Hibbs, D. A., Jr. 1977. Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review 71:1467-87.
33. Hofferbert, R., and I. Budge. 1993. Controversies: Party platforms and government spending. American Political Science Review 87:744-59.
34. Hufbauer, G. C., J. J. Schott, and K. E. Elliot. 1990. Economic sanctions reconsidered, Washington, DC: Institution for International Economics.
35. Kaempfer, W., and A. D. Lowenberg. 1988. The theory of international economic sanctions: Apublic choice approach. American Economic Review 4:786-93.
36. Knorr, K. 1977. International economic leverage and its uses. In Economic issues and national security, edited by Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, 99-126. Lawrence, KS: Regents.
37. Lancaster, T. 1990. The econometric analysis of transition data. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
38. Lenway, S. A. 1988. Between war and commerce: Economic sanctions as a tool of statecraft. International Organization 42:397-426.
39. Martin, L. 1992. Coercive cooperation: Explaining multilateral economic sanctions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
40. McGillivray, F., and A. Smith. 2000. Trust and cooperation through agent-specific punishments. International Organization 54:809-24.
41. Morgan, C., and V. Schwebach. 1997. Fools suffer gladly: The use of economic sanctions in international crises. International Interactions 21:27-50.
42. North, D. C. 1981. Structure and change in economic history. New York: Norton.
43. Olson, M., Jr. 1993. Dictatorship, democracy and development. American Political Science Review 87:567-76.
44. Pape, R. 1997. Why economic sanctions do not work. International Security 2:90-136.
45. Purcell, S. 1998. Cuba. In Economic sanctions and American diplomacy, edited by R. N. Hass. Washington, DC: Brookings University Press.
46. Rogers, E. S. 1996. Using economic sanctions to control regional conflicts. Security Studies 5:43-72.
47. Schreiber, A. P. 1973. Economic coercion as an instrument of foreign policy: U.S. measures against Cuba and the Dominican Republic. World Politics 25:387-413.
48. Schultz, K. A. 1998. Domestic opposition and signaling in international crises. American Political Science Review 92:829-44.
49. Smith, A. 1996. The success and use of economic sanctions. International Interactions 21:229-45.
50. Sodhy, P. 1988. Malaysian-American relations during Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia, 1963-66. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 19:111-36.
51. Tsebelis, G. 1990. Are sanctions effective? A game theoretic analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution 34:2-28.
52. _. 1999. Veto players and law production in parliamentary democracies: An empirical analysis. American Political Science Review 93:591-608.
53. USA ENGAGE. 2004. Statement of purpose, http://www.usaengage.org/archives/background/purpose.html/.
54. Wallensteen, P. 1968. Characteristics of economic sanctions. Journal of Peace Research 3:248-67.
55. Warwick, P. 1994. Government survival in parliamentary democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press.
56. Wendt, A. 1999. A social theory of international politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.