Multiple board appointments and firm performance in emerging economies: Evidence from India

Pacific Basin Finance Journal

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 271-293

  Sarkar, Jayati ^a   Sarkar, Subrata ^a  

^a INDIRA GANDHI INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH   (India)

Author keywords

Busy directors; Firm performance; Multiple directorships

Indexed keywords

EID: 59949093623     PISSN: 0927538X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2008.02.002     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. Au K., Peng M.W., and Wang D. Interlocking directorates, firm strategies, and performance in pre-1997 hong kong: towards a research agenda. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 17 1 (2000) 28-47
2. Beasley M. An empirical analysis of the relation between board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71 (1996) 443-465
3. Bertrand M., Mehta P., and Mullainathan S. Ferreting out tunneling: an application to Indian business groups. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 1 (2002) 121-148
4. Bhagat S., and Black B. The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance. The Journal of Corporation Law 27 (2002) 231-273
5. Brown, D.J., 1998, Financial transparency and external managerial labor market activity, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, CEPR.
6. Brown W.O., and Maloney M.T. Exit, voice and the role of corporate directors: evidence from acquisition performance. Working Paper (1999), University of Virginia
7. BRT. Principles of Corporate Governance, A White Paper from the Business Roundtable (2002). http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/704.pdf Washington D.C. http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/704.pdf
8. Burt R.S. Corporate Profits and Cooptation: Networks of Market Constraints and Directorate ties in the American Economy (1983), Academic Press, New York
9. Booth J., and Deli D. Factors affecting the number of outside directors held by CEOs. Journal of Financial Economics 40 (1995) 81-104
10. Chung C.-N. Managerial structure of business groups in Taiwan: the inner circle system and its social organization. The Developing Economies XLI-1 (2003) 37-64 March
11. CII. Desirable Corporate Governance (1998), Confederation of Indian Industry, New Delhi
12. Core J., Holthausen R., and Larcker D. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51 (1999) 371-406
13. Cotter J., Shivdasani A., and Zenner M. Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?. Journal of Financial Economics 43 (1997) 195-218
14. Dahya J., and McConnell J.J. Board composition, corporate performance, and the Cadbury Committee recommendation. Working Paper, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, USA (2003)
15. DCA. Report on Excellence in Corporate Governance (2000), Department of Company Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. http://dca.nic.in/corp-exc.htm http://dca.nic.in/corp-exc.htm
16. DCA. Concept Paper on Company Law (2004), Department of Company Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. http://dca.nic.in/bill/comp_act.htm http://dca.nic.in/bill/comp_act.htm
17. Demsetz H., and Lehn K. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93 (1985) 1155-1177
18. DiMaggio P., and Powell W. The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review 48 (1983) 147-160
19. Fama E. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88 (1980) 288-307
20. Fama E., and Jensen M. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26 (1983) 301-326
21. Ferris S., Jagannathan M., and Pritchard A.C. Too busy to mind business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. Journal of Finance 58 3 (2003) 1087-1111
22. Fich E., and Shivdasani A. Are busy boards effective monitors?. Journal of Finance 61 2 (2006) 681-724
23. Freund R.J., and Wilson W.J. Regression Analysis (1998), Academic Press
24. Granovetter M. Coase revisited: business groups in the modern economy. Industrial and Corporate Change 4 1 (1995) 93-130
25. Hamilton G.G. Organization and market processes in Taiwan's capitalist economy. In: Orrù M., Biggart N.W., and Hamilton G.G. (Eds). The Economic Organization of East Asian Capitalism (1997), Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, Calif.
26. Harris I.C., and Shimizu K. Too busy to serve? An examination of the influence of overboarded directors. Journal of Management Studies 41 (2004) 775-798
27. Hermalin B.E., and Weisbach M.S. The determinants of board composition. Rand Journal of Economics 19 (1988) 589-606
28. Hermalin B.E., and Weisbach M.S. The effects of board composition and direct I incentives on firm performance. Financial Management 20 (1991) 101-112
29. Kang J.K., and Shivdasani A. Firm performance, corporate governance, and top executive turnover in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics 38 (1995) 29-58
30. Khanna T., and Palepu K. Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis of diversified Indian business groups. Journal of Finance 55 2 (2000) 867-891
31. Khanna T., and Rivkin J.W. Ties that bind business groups: evidence from an emerging market. HBS Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 00-068 (2001), Harvard Business School
32. Klein A. Firm performance and board committee structure. Journal of Law & Economics 41 (1998) 275-303
33. Korn/Ferry International. 25th Annual Board of Directors Study, Los Angeles, CA (1998)
34. Kust M. Foreign Enterprises in India: Laws and Policies (1964), The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill
35. Lipton M., and Lorsch J. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. Business Lawyer 48 (1992) 59-77
36. McConnell J., and Servaes H. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics 27 (1990) 595-612
37. Mehta M.M. The Structure of Indian Industries (1955), Popular Book Depot, Bombay
38. Miwa Y., and Ramseyer J.M. Corporate governance in transitional economies: lessons from the pre-war Japanese cotton textile industry. Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2000) 171-204
39. Mizruchi M.S., and Stearns L.B. A longitudinal study of borrowing by large American corporations. Administrative Science Quarterly 39 (1994) 118-140
40. Morck R., Shleifer A., and Vishny R.W. Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988) 293-315
41. NACD. Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Committee on Director Professionalism (1996), NACD, Washington D.C
42. Ouchi W.G. Markets, bureaucracies and clan. Administrative Science Quarterly 25 (1980) 129-145
43. Pfeffer J. Interorganizational influence and managerial attitudes. Academy of Management Journal 15 (1972) 317-330
44. Sarkar J., and Sarkar S. Large shareholder activism in corporate governance in developing countries: evidence from India. International Review of Finance 1 3 (2000) 161-194
45. Shah A., and Thomas S. Securities markets. In: Parikh K.S. (Ed). India Development Report (1997), Oxford University Press 167-192
46. Shivdasani A., and Yermack D. CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: an empirical analysis. Journal of Finance 54 (1999) 1829-1853
47. Useem M. The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of Business Political Activity in the US and UK (1984), Oxford University Press, New York
48. Williamson O. The economic institutions of capitalism: firms, markets and relational contracting (1985), Free Press, New York
49. Xu X., and Wang Y. Ownership structure, corporate governance, and corporate performance: the case of Chinese stock companies. Policy Research Working Paper 1794 (1997), World Bank
50. Yermack D. A higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40 (1996) 185-205