The time structure of self-enforcing agreements

Econometrica

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 547-582

  Ray, Debraj ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Constrained efficiency; Contracts; Dynamic incentives; Limited enforcement; Principal agent theory

Indexed keywords

CONSTRAINT THEORY; CONTRACTS; OPTIMIZATION; PARETO PRINCIPLE;

CONSTRAINED EFFICIENCY; DYNAMIC INCENTIVES;

ECONOMICS;

EID: 0036214582     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00295     Document Type: Article

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