Social memory, evidence, and conflict

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 559-574

  Anderlini, Luca ^a   Gerardi, Dino ^b   Lagunoff, Roger ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Dynastic games; Physical evidence; Private communication; Social memory

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953695952     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2009.06.006     Document Type: Article

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